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THE PRIZE IS RIGHT: AMENDING THE MPA
TO PUT PATIENTS FIRST
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Universal Health Services Inc., unlicensed medi-
cal staff at a mental health clinic caused the treatment of a teenage girl
to be delayed, ultimately leading to her death.1 The teenager became
a patient of Arbour Counseling Services (Arbour), in 2004.2 After al-
most three years of being transferred from one unlicensed staff mem-
ber to the next, the teenager began suffering from seizures and
eventually died in 2009.3 After her death, the parents were informed
that the counselors looking after their daughter were not properly li-
censed.4 The parents reached out to various state agencies in Massa-
chusetts.5 During their investigation, a state agency found that since
1996, multiple physicians were working for the mental health clinic
without a license.6
However, the state agency only suspended one of the physicians at
the clinic.7 In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in Univer-
sal Health Services, Inc. v. United States decided the suit against the
mental health clinic and obtained justice for the parents.8 Yet, this
“justice” came after almost twenty years of multiple providers at the
clinic practicing without a license.9 Could there not have been a solu-
tion that would have caught the unlicensed practice before harm was
done to the teenage girl? With a considerable amount of unlicensed
practice of medicine,10 what more proactive solutions should officials
start considering?
1. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016), rev’g United
States v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d. 504, 509 (1st Cir. 2015). The court of appeals
opinion is cited because it provides important factual information involved in the case.
2. Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 1997.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. United States v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d at 510, vacated, Universal Health
Servs. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 504. Two Arbour employees were prosecuted, however, only one of these physicians
was suspended while the other had to pay $1000 in civil penalties, but continued to practice. Id.
at 510.
8. Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 1995–96.
9. United States v. Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d at 510.
10. See infra Part II.C.
149
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The U.S. healthcare system is arguably the most regulated area of
law; yet, with a lack of sufficient enforcement mechanisms, the unli-
censed practice of medicine remains problematic.11 Unlicensed prac-
tice is deadly for patients and remains alarmingly prevalent.12 There
are about 4,000 to 4,500 nationwide physician prosecutions per year.13
These violations include either cases of physicians exceeding the scope
of their license or cases of physicians not comporting with the rules
under their license; both constitute unlicensed practice.14 In 2015,
there was a total of 1,238 individuals whose licenses were restricted,
655 individuals who were put on probation, 594 individuals who were
suspended, and 267 individuals whose licenses were revoked.15 As
demonstrated by this data, the system can catch unlicensed practice;
however, the system does not have a way to proactively prevent and
deter unlicensed practice before harm is done to patients. Unlicensed
practice harms patients and the medical profession.16 When an indi-
vidual lacks the medical education required and then provides unedu-
cated care to patients, the care will be substandard compared to the
care that could have been provided by a licensed individual.17 To illus-
trate, if the “physician” is not adequately educated, then the informa-
tion the patient tells the “physician” will not be effectively used.18 The
lack of proper licensure for the services provided leads to thousands
of individuals committing unlicensed practice per year nationwide.19
This then leads to injuries from substandard care, improper treat-
ments, or delays in receiving care.20
11. See David C. Szostak, Vertical Integration in Health Care: The Regulatory Landscape, 17
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 65, 67 (2015) (discussing the multiple statutory authorities involved
in healthcare causing complex fragmentation); see also U.S. Medical Regulatory Trends and Ac-
tions, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., http://www.fsmb.org/globalassets/advocacy/publications/us-
medical-regulatory-trends-actions.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) [hereinafter FED’N OF STATE
MED. BDS.].
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See also FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 20 (showing how unlicensed prac-
tice remains prevalent even with the current amount of regulation involved).
14. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 7 (showing state medical board data on
unlicensed practice).
15. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 19.
16. See infra Parts II.C–D.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See examples provided at notes 148–65 infra.
19. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 20 (showing the prevalence of unli-
censed practice).
20. See e.g., Jackson v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 3:15-CV-750 (CSH) 2016 WL 3460304, at
*3 (D. Conn. June 20, 2016) (finding that the physician directly caused a delay in the patient
receiving treatment with the physicians who diagnosed the tumor and this delay caused detri-
mental effects on the patient’s health).
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Without a new system of deterrence, patients will continue to be
injured. States currently regulate the practice of medicine through
their respective Medical Practice Acts (MPA). In general, each state’s
MPA provides statutory enforcement to ensure public health and
safety by keeping patients safe from unprofessional practices of
medicine.21 However, the current prohibitions embodied in the MPA
fail to effectively deter individuals, as evidenced by the number of vio-
lators who continuously practice without a license.22 Policymakers
cannot deter this abuse in the healthcare system without implement-
ing proper enforcement and oversight of the current regulations.
Thousands of individuals violate their licensure or practice without a
license each year; this is evidence of the need for proper enforce-
ment.23 Violators are finding new avenues for unlicensed practice
daily, thus making the current enforcement futile.24 Prior to an indi-
vidual being injured, private citizens and the government have little
incentive to proactively prevent unlicensed practice.25 Thus, this prac-
tice will not be deterred without the implementation of such an incen-
tive in state-created MPAs.
While the federal government has created financial incentive en-
forcements in the past, such as the False Claims Act (the FCA), the
focus of these enforcements is typically based on claims that result in
substantial financial harm to the government.26 The FCA is a federal
law that prevents individuals and companies from defrauding the gov-
ernment, and it is the primary tool in fighting fraud against the gov-
ernment.27 The FCA provides a financial deterrence by authorizing
private individuals to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the government and
punish the violator that is defrauding the government.28 Actions
21. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11.
22. See infra Part II.C and text accompanying notes 148–165.
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. Whistleblowing History Overview, WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, https://www.whistleblowersin
ternational.com/what-is-whistleblowing/history/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) [hereinafter WHISTLE-
BLOWERS INT’L].
26. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016);
WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25, at 2. The implementation of the FCA was justified for
individuals who submit false or fraudulent claims because these types of claims have million-
dollar reimbursements for the government. Id. Unlike unlicensed practice, which does not pro-
vide million-dollar reimbursements because the maximum penalty for it is ten thousand dollars.
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3.5(a) (2018).
27. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012); Robert L. Vogel, The False Claims Act and Its Impact on
Medical Practices, VOGEL, SLADE & GOLDSTEIN, LLP., https://www.vsg-law.com/blog/the-false-
claims-act-and-its-impact-on-medical-practices/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
28. See Vogel, supra note 27.
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brought by these private individuals are called qui tam suits.29 The
private individual, known as a “relator,” reports her findings to the
government, and if the government chooses to join the suit, the relator
will share a percentage of the damages recovered from the suit or set-
tlement.30 These recovery percentages range anywhere from fifteen to
twenty-five percent of the proceeds.31 Such percentages provide mil-
lion-dollar incentives that encourage relators to report physicians or
companies that are defrauding the government.32 These financial in-
centives increase the likelihood of private individuals being willing to
report, thus providing a deterrence for violators out of their fear of
being reported.33 Qui tam actions remain a strong deterrence for
healthcare violations; in fact, qui tam actions under the FCA have re-
covered about $40 billion.34 However, the FCA focuses on catching
fraudulent medical billing—not unlicensed practice.
Without implementation of an incentive system like that of the
FCA, each state MPA continues to allow a high presence of unli-
censed practice and zero incentive to report it. Considering the suc-
cess of qui tam actions within the FCA as an incentive system to
prevent fraud, employing qui tam actions in the MPA may provide the
needed incentive to prevent unlicensed practice. Incorporating a qui
tam action into the MPA could provide the necessary incentives for
private individuals to report unlicensed practice and thus, deter viola-
tors from unlicensed practice out of their fear of being reported. The
MPA qui tam could be a superior solution to unlicensed practice. By
shifting the responsibility of preventing unlicensed practice from the
federal and state government to private individuals, a more concen-
trated framework develops.35 Private individuals could begin re-
searching, investigating, and assisting in the prosecution of unlicensed
practice and thus, better prevent unlicensed practice.36 Yet, the gov-
ernment may not be willing to employ the qui tam action for the
29. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25, at 2.
30. See Vogel, supra note 27.
31. Vogel, supra note 27.
32. Vogel, supra note 27. With the largest private individual reward being $100 million, private
individuals are incentivized by the possibility of winning this amount, therefore will report the
fraud. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
33. See Vogel, supra note 27.
34. B. Nathaniel Garrett, Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision Fails to Go Far Enough:
Making the Case for a Qui Tam Provision in a Revised Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, 81 U. CIN.
L. REV. 765, 771 (2012).
35. See, for example, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012), discussed in Part II.E
infra.
36. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25 (stating the financial incentives given to pri-
vate individuals for their information have been as steep as $100 million).
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MPA. Fraudulent billing causes extensive financial harm to the gov-
ernment, and the implementation of the FCA qui tams provides sub-
stantial financial reimbursement for the government, thus justifying its
implementation.37 The financial harm is the key justification in imple-
menting qui tam actions.38 Implementing the qui tam action for unli-
censed practice would likely not be justified because unlicensed
practice does not cause such extensive financial harm to the govern-
ment relative to the harm from fraudulent billing.39 Rather than harm-
ing the federal government, the harm from unlicensed practice is to
the patients.40 Under the MPA, any financial inventive to the govern-
ment from qui tams would be considered insignificant when compared
to the reimbursement provided by the FCA.41
So, what remedies are left for smaller claims, such as unlicensed
practice, that may not meet the financial threshold of governmental
harm needed to justify implementation of qui tam actions? The gov-
ernment does have an interest in proper healthcare, so how can the
government incentivize private individuals to assist in the enforce-
ment of the MPA, without qui tam-like awards? Incentives schemes
for claims that are unattractive to the government, yet still hold a gov-
ernmental interest, have been considered in other areas of law.42 In-
centives such as prizes and patent rights are considered within the
intellectual property debate. Intellectual property provides patent
benefits for an individual’s innovations by granting “intellectual prop-
erty rights” and giving the individual the ability to charge “monopoly
prices for [her] inventions.”43 However, patent incentives under the
intellectual property system are “offset by the deadweight loss from
allowing innovators to charge monopoly prices.”44 To correct the dead
weight loss, academics have considered replacing the intellectual
37. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
38. See David Mitchell, An Introduction to the False Claims Act, 51 ARK. LAWYER, no. 3, 2016,
at 27. The MPA “was originally enacted in 1863 in response to concerns that suppliers to the
Union Army were defrauding the government.” Id. Therefore, in order for qui tam actions to be
implemented in an area of law, substantial financial harm to the government must be shown. Id.
39. FCA claims have million-dollar reimbursements for the government. See WHISTLEBLOW-
ERS INT’L, supra note 25. Unlike unlicensed practice, which provides a maximum penalty of ten
thousand dollars. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3.5(a) (2018).
40. See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
41. Compare WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25 (explaining that FCA claims potentially
yield million-dollar reimbursements for the government) with 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3.5(a)
(providing a maximum civil penalty of ten thousand dollars for unlicensed practice).
42. See infra notes 283–299 for a discussion of the use of qui tam actions to enforce federal
regulations in the housing and financial sectors.
43. Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 999, 1001 (2014).
44. Id.
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property system with a prize system.45 In this system, a prize is a “pay-
ment funded out of general revenue that is made to a[n] [individual]
conditional on delivering a specified” action.46 The incentives from
these prize systems are the payouts that are based on the innovation’s
social value.47 The innovator receives these payouts, but the innovator
does not retain the right to keep the innovation from the public and
charge monopoly prices.48 This sort of incentive scheme has been said
to prevent pointless innovation payouts, thus providing “superior in-
centives for innovation.”49 Yet, the debate over how to determine the
payout price of these prizes is highly contested.50 The concept of set-
ting the “perfect” price for the prize—the “perfect” price being one
that will recoup research costs while still benefiting the government—
brings concerns of corruption and unfairness.51 Corruption may stem
from how the government determines the prize price.52 The possibility
of unfairness in the method the government uses to set the price,
rather than allowing for private individuals to set the price, brings the
risk of the government undervaluing the innovation.53 However, these
concerns are subsided due to regulations such as the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA).54 Regulations like FOIA provide barriers to
the possible corruption and unfairness conceivably present in the prize
system.55 FOIA would allow private citizens to investigate the basis of
the government’s prize valuation and possibly challenge it, thus
resolving concerns that could arise in setting the perfect price.
45. Id.
46. Nancy T. Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 52 (2002).
47. Roin, supra note 43, at 1002.
48. Roin, supra note 43, at 1009–10.
49. See Roin, supra note 43, at 1003. Roin explains that pointless payouts are prevented in the
prize system because the prize granted to the private individual for their innovation is quantified
after the innovation is on the market and its social value is determined. Roin, supra note 43, at
1002. Whereas the intellectual property system quantifies the innovation prior to releasing it on
the market. Roin, supra note 43, at 1002.
50. Roin, supra note 43, at 1006–07.
51. Roin, supra note 43, at 1027 (discussing the presence of government corruption in deter-
mining the value of the reward, explaining the government may purposely undervalue the inno-
vation in order to prevent a high prize payout, but retain the benefit of the innovation).
52. See Roin, supra note 43, at 1018, 1027.
53. Shavell & Ypersele, infra note 208, at 541–42 (“consider[ing] how good innovators’ infor-
mation is [about demand for the innovation in] . . . relation to the government’s”).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); FOIA, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.foia.gov (last visited Mar.
13, 2018).
55. FOIA is a regulation that allows private individuals to request access to government infor-
mation. See FOIA, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.foia.gov (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). The
regulation helps prevent government corruption by ensuring the government’s compliance with
regulations. Id. This is ensured by providing transparency into government action and giving
private individuals access to observe government action. Id.
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The prize system is a valid incentive system for financially smaller
claims like unlicensed practice. The system would provide an incentive
to report unlicensed practice and thus, the fear of being scrutinized by
patients would effectively deter violators. This Note extracts the prize
argument from the intellectual property debate and applies it to unli-
censed practice as an incentive system to motivate private individuals
to report unlicensed practice.
This Note will analyze which enforcement system should be added
to the Illinois MPA to prevent ex ante unlicensed practice. The analy-
sis will compare which system will incentivize private individuals to
get involved and which system is more likely to be implemented. First,
this Note will discuss the forms of unlicensed practice and the current
prevention measures under the Illinois MPA. Second, the focus will
shift to the success of qui tam suits within the FCA by examining past
qui tam suits. This discussion will then evaluate the derivative findings
of unlicensed practice in these FCA qui tam suits and examine
whether the FCA disproportionally focuses on false claim submissions
in comparison to unlicensed practice, thus justifying the addition of
qui tams to the MPA. Third, this Note will discuss the intellectual
property debate between the patent system and the prize system. Af-
terwards, this Note will explain why remedies, such as higher civil
damages or additional state funding, will not help prevent or deter
unlicensed practice. This Note will go on to recommend and analyze
whether the addition of qui tam actions to Illinois’ MPA could act as a
new barrier to unlicensed practice. Finally, this Note will recommend
the addition of the prize system to the Illinois MPA and analyze the
likely implications of this addition.
Part II provides: (1) history on the creation of the Illinois MPA; (2)
an introduction of the current forms of unlicensed practice; (3) data
on the number of claims brought for unlicensed practice in the U.S.
and Illinois; (4) a description of the current prosecution practices
under Illinois’ MPA; (5) background information on the FCA, the
FCA’s impact, and current qui tam examples; and (6) background in-
formation on incentive schemes debated by intellectual property
academics.
Part III will discuss alternative remedies to unlicensed practice and
why they are inadequate. Next, Part III will explore how adding qui
tam actions to Illinois’ MPA could provide a better solution to
preventing unlicensed practice when compared to the current qui tam
actions under the FCA. Finally, Part III will explain why the prize
incentive system would motivate private individuals to report unli-
censed practice, and therefore is the best solution for preventing unli-
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censed practice. Lastly, Part IV of this Note will discuss possible
critiques and the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the
prize system for the MPA.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of the history behind the Illinois
MPA and a brief description of its sections. It will then go on to high-
light the types of unlicensed practice in today’s society, while explor-
ing its emerging avenues. Afterwards, this section will provide a
summary of data showing the prevalence of unlicensed practice in Illi-
nois. Next, this Part will describe what constitutes unlicensed practice
in Illinois under the MPA and examine the current success of prose-
cuting unlicensed practice. Thereafter, this section will discuss the his-
tory of the FCA and provide examples of its failed attempts at
catching unlicensed practice in a timely manner. Finally, this Part will
explore the background of incentive schemes within intellectual prop-
erty with a concentration on the prize system.
A. History of Illinois’ MPA
Prior to the MPA, any individual had the ability to practice
medicine. In fact, prior to the 1900’s, officials estimated that 3,600 of
the physicians practicing in Illinois were not graduates from any medi-
cal school.56 Simply putting up a sign on the outside of an office or
even a house deemed the individual as licensed to practice.57
By 1900, almost every state passed its own MPA to enforce licensed
medical practice.58 Distinctively, Illinois’ MPA gave broad enforce-
ment powers to the Illinois Board of Health (Illinois Board). For ex-
ample, while some states only required an individual to register with
local authorities in order to practice medicine, Illinois created the Illi-
nois Board and gave it extensive authority. This board was tasked with
strictly regulating all types of physicians; testing applicants; creating
and implementing necessary policies; and enforcing policies upon ap-
plicants and physicians.59 After the passage of the MPA, an estimated
1,400 unlicensed individuals fled Illinois in order to avoid prosecu-
tion.60 Such action was largely due to the complaints that were re-
56. Clinton Sandvick, Enforcing Medical Licensing in Illinois: 1877–1890, 82 YALE J. BIOL-
OGY & MED. 67, 69 (2009).
57. Id. at 67.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 68–69.
60. Sandvick, supra, note 56, at 69.
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ported to the Illinois Board by private individuals and by other
physicians.61
The effort to stop unlicensed practice quickly failed when individu-
als and physicians began maliciously accusing other professionals of
false allegations, and when unlicensed individuals found loopholes in
the licensing system.62 In an effort to build back trust, the Illinois
Board created “quasi-judicial hearings.”63 These hearings provided a
fast-track route to investigating and resolving accusations against phy-
sicians. However, the system was infiltrated once again when individu-
als unlawfully practiced under false identities to prevent being
reported. In looking for monetary opportunities, these individuals in-
humanely took advantage of vulnerable classes by providing astonish-
ingly inadequate medical care.64
The MPA provides that the Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation (IDFPR), as it operates today, shall: (1) make
standards of education requirements; (2) effectuate policies of
medicine to ensure quality medical training in licensing; and (3) for-
mulate rules for administration of the MPA.65 Moreover, IDFPR was
given the authority to prosecute disciplinary actions on licenses such
as revocation, suspension, probation, and any other action IDFPR
deems proper.66 Within the IDFPR, there is a Complaint Committee
responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against physi-
cians.67 Additionally, there is a Medical Licensing Board composed of
seven members, five of which are licensed physicians.68 The Medical
Licensing Board reviews policies regarding licensure, examination,
and promulgation of rules.69 These provisions allow IDFPR to assist
Illinois in actively thwarting unlicensed practice.
In the hopes of being able to prosecute more violators, Illinois ex-
panded the definition of “licensed practice” to provide more avenues
of prosecution and close the loopholes in the licensing system.70 To-
day, the licensure requirement states that professionals shall not prac-
tice any branch of medicine to treat human ailments without a valid
61. Sandvick, supra, note 56, at 69.
62. Sandvick, supra, note 56, at 69.
63. Sandvick, supra, note 56, at 69
64. Sandvick, supra, note 56, at 71–72.
65. 225 ILL COMP. STAT. 60/10 (2018).
66. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22 (2018).
67. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/7.5 (2018) (allowing the Board to do all the following: recom-
mend a complaint to be closed, refer a complaint for review, and make a decision regarding
action to be taken on a complaint file).
68. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/8(A) (2018).
69. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/8(F) (2018).
70. Sandvick, supra, note 56, at 72.
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and active license.71 The Illinois MPA states that any individual who
practices, attempts to practice, or offers to practice medicine without a
license shall be subject to civil penalties and any other penalty pro-
vided by law.72 The Illinois MPA employs the term “medicine” as to
include “curative or remedial” care or processes such as “the healing
art” and “the science preserving health and treating disease for the
purpose of cure—whether such treatment involves the use of medical
substances or not.”73 The term “practice” is used to mean the “exer-
cise of a calling or profession which is the application of science or
knowledge to the wants of men in the recurring incidents of life.”74
However, broadening the meaning of the practice of medicine to in-
clude more violators remains ineffective, as new forms of unlicensed
practice emerge.75
B. What Are the Forms Unlicensed Practice Can Take?
Many states differ in which forms of licensed practices are regulated
under their respective MPA and the standards that apply.76 For exam-
ple, there are varying laws for “corporate medicine” and “delegation
of medicine.”77 While there is no set definition of corporate medicine,
it is typically used to describe when a hospital, or healthcare organiza-
tion, manages the practice of medicine. Hospitals can practice corpo-
rate medicine by exercising too much control over the physicians,
which affects the manner in which medicine is delivered to patients.78
Hence, “corporate practice” is essentially when a corporation “indi-
rectly practices” medicine with a licensed physician.79 In Illinois, cor-
porate practice is not prohibited by the MPA, as it broadly states,
“[n]othing in this Act prohibits . . . entities authorized by law to em-
ploy physicians from also employing other licensed healthcare work-
ers . . . .”80 However, some states have found corporate practice
71. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/50 (2018).
72. Id.
73. People v. Barnett, 240 Ill. App. 357, 361 (1926) (quoting People ex rel. Gage v. Siman, 115
N.E. 817, 818 (1917); see also 225 ILL. COMP. STAT 60/50.
74. People v. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill. 370, 377 (1889).
75. See infra Part II.B.
76. Telehealth & Multi-State Physician Licensure: Don’t Get Caught in the Tangled Web of
Inconsistent and Troublesome State Physician Licensure Laws, INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE,
https://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/Conference_Handouts/Compliance_Insti
tute/2016/111print2.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) [hereinafter INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE].
77. Id.
78. Michael E. Schaff & Glenn P. Prives, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Is it
Applicable to Your Client?, AHLA BUS. LAW & GOVERNANCE PRACTICE GRP., May 2010, at 2.
79. Id.
80. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22.3 (2018).
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provisions constitute unlicensed practice of medicine because the unli-
censed entity or individual is camouflaged by a business, and in effect
uses the benefits of another individual’s license.81 Under the Illinois
MPA, corporate practice, however permitted, can amount to unli-
censed practice when used incorrectly.82 In a publication by the Amer-
ican Health Lawyers Association, Michael E. Schaff and Glenn P.
Prives provide guidance on corporate practice of medicine with the
following example: C is a licensed chiropractor and P is a licensed
physician and they agree to form an LLC together. C is responsible
for running the day-to-day business operations while P provides treat-
ment and supervision. C exercises control over all of the company’s
affairs, including medical matters. The limited control that P has cre-
ates the appearance of control, but it could be argued that P is a mere
employee. Consequently, P does not have the power to control the
medical matters of the company, which violates the MPA for corpo-
rate practice of medicine because C is not a physician and C has con-
trol over medical matters.83
Third parties that conduct business with the hospital can also be
charged with unlicensed corporate practice if their control affects the
medical matters of the hospital.84 Violations involving third parties
can also be termed as the “aiding and abetting” of unlicensed prac-
tice.85 The aiding and abetting provision in Illinois’ MPA prohibits
physicians from allowing unlicensed individuals to practice.86 The aid-
ing and abetting of unlicensed practice and the corporate practice of
medicine can occur when a corporation has majority control over the
hospital that employs licensed physicians.87 Another example of aid-
ing and abetting occurs when a management services corporation con-
tracts with a physician’s organization to treat patients.88 Physician
organizations often construct such agreements with management ser-
vices because they assist the physicians in securing employment with a
81. Schaff & Prives, supra note 78, at 2.
82. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22.3.
83. Schaff & Prives, supra note 78, at 4–5.
84. Corporate Practice of Medicine, MED. BD. OF CAL. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.mbc.ca.gov/
Licensees/Corporate_Practice.aspx [hereinafter MED. BD. OF CAL.].
85. See Louis Fine, Beware of “Aiding and Abetting” the Unlicensed Practice of Medicine, LAW
OFFICE OF LOUIS R. FINE, http://www.lrflaw.com/beware-of-aiding-and-abetting-the-unlicensed-
practice-of-medicine/ (last visited Oct.16, 2017).
86. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84.
87. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84. When an unlicensed corporate officer has the power to
make business decisions that influence a licensed physician’s medical decisions, the corporate
officer is said to be practicing medicine without a license. And by complying to the business
decisions, the physician is aiding and abetting the unlicensed practice of medicine.
88. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84.
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hospital.89 A management corporation will typically consist of non-
physicians, who receive a fee or a portion of the physician organiza-
tion’s profits in return for securing employment contracts with hospi-
tals for the physicians.90 So far, the described arrangement is legal
under the MPA; however, if the management corporation mistakenly
retains 50% of the physician organization’s profits, the arrangement
constitutes unlicensed practice of medicine.91 This form of unlawful
practice can continue if the management corporation uses the physi-
cians’ licenses to conduct business with other companies or if the cor-
poration becomes involved in selecting medical staff for hospitals.92
This level of impermissible control emerges into a situation analogous
to an employer-employee relationship and constitutes unlicensed
practice of medicine.93 The aiding and abetting provision is necessary
because arrangements controlling more than 50% of a physician’s cor-
poration’s profits typically lead to a physician’s inability to control her
own practice, thereby increasing the likelihood that the management
company will unduly influence the physician’s judgment.94 Addition-
ally, this unlawful situation can lead to derivative conflicts of interest
for the physician’s patients.95 Moreover, from a policy standpoint, this
type of unlawful practice of medicine is prohibited because it is “in-
congruous in the workings of a professional regulatory licensing
scheme which is based on personal qualification, [personal] responsi-
bility and [personal] sanction.”96 In theory, preventing a management
company from obtaining a majority of profits from a physician’s prac-
tice may seem avoidable; however, in practice, this is more
complicated.97
In accordance with aiding and abetting medical practice, the legal
authorization to “delegate” medical tasks to assistants, nurses, or
other employees can be lawful to a certain extent.98 Delegation occurs
when a licensed individual, acting within the scope of their individual
89. Medical Board of California, Corporate Practice of Medicine Presentation, YOUTUBE
(July 18, 2016), https://youtu.be/OUEN-nYLomo [hereinafter Corporate Practice of Medicine
Presentation].
90. Cf Kalechstein v. Abbassian, No. 15C5929, 2017 WL 3394721 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2017)
(showing a professional organization improperly permitting fee sharing between a physician and
a non-physician).
91. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84.
92. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84.
93. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84.
94. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84.
95. MED. BD. OF CAL., supra note 84.
96. Corporate Practice of Medicine Presentation, supra note 89 (quoting 65 Ops. Cal. Atty.
Gen. 223, 225 (1982)).
97. Corporate Practice of Medicine Presentation, supra note 89.
98. Fine, supra note 85.
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license, assigns a medical task to an unlicensed individual.99 The Illi-
nois MPA limits the forms that delegations of medical practice can
take. For example, the MPA regulates prescription dispensing, stating
the dispensing must be “the personal act of the person licensed under
this Act and may not be delegated to any other person not licensed
under this Act . . . unless such delegated dispensing functions are
under the direct supervision of the physician. . . .”100 However, when a
physician chooses to delegate they must sufficiently supervise, remain
aware of whom they are delegating to, and remain aware of what they
are delegating.101 Delegation of patient care tasks to unqualified or
unsupervised individuals is prohibited, and some tasks like diagnosis,
treatment planning, and prescribing can never be delegated—super-
vised or not.102 Delegating does not constitute unlicensed practice as
long as the delegator assigns tasks that are within the delegatee’s title
of employment.103 Physicians that hire unlicensed healthcare profes-
sionals often make mistakes when delegating medical tasks.104
In addition, exceeding the scope of a physician’s license is likely to
occur due to new inventions of healthcare access and treatments like
telemedicine, crowdsourcing, and controlled substances.105 For exam-
ple, exceeding the scope of a license can occur either by purposefully
or accidentally overprescribing or by fraudulently prescribing a con-
trolled substance.106 Overprescribing and fraudulently prescribing
clearly exceed the scope of a physician’s license, and thus constitute
unlicensed practice.
Exceeding the scope of a license can be less obvious when physi-
cians falsely represent themselves as a different type of physician and
when physicians give medical advice to patients on medical proce-
99. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/54.2 (2018).
100. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/33 (2018).
101. Fine, supra note 85.
102. Fine, supra note 85.
103. Fine, supra note 85.
104. Use of Unlicensed Healthcare Personnel, OR. MED. BD., http://www.oregon.gov/omb/
board/philosophy/Pages/Use-of-Unlicensed-Healthcare-Personnel.aspx (last visited Mar. 13,
2018).
105. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/49.5 (2018); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/33 (2018); Crowdsourcing
Medicine?, STANFORD LAW SCH. BLOGS: LAW & BIOSCIENCES BLOG, https://law.stanford.edu/
2015/04/23/lawandbiosciences-2015-04-23-crowdsourcing-medicine/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
106. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/33 (permitting physicians to prescribe drugs in the ordinary
course of practicing medicine and to dispense them in good faith, thus prohibiting acts such as
overprescribing medicine, inferring from which would be exceeding the scope of one’s license);
see also Olefsky v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, No. 1-15-2842, 2016 WL 7380548 (Ill.
App. Ct. Dec. 16, 2016) (holding a physician liable for fraudulently filling prescriptions).
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dures that they are not licensed to perform.107 While false representa-
tions are frequently a result of differing opinions in medical studies,
innocently advising on procedures that are outside a physician’s
knowledge of practice amounts to unlicensed practice of medicine.108
Two areas of growth in such unlicensed practice include providing
Botox injections and laser hair removal services to patients.109 Addi-
tionally, technological developments in telemedicine continue opening
dangerous avenues to aiding and abetting unlicensed practice. In
nearly all states, including Illinois, physicians must have a license in
each state they intend to practice.110 However, with the advancement
of telemedicine, medical practice has moved towards permitting the
practice of medicine across state lines.111 But, each state has varying
statutory and licensing requirements. The variance of requirements is
important to acknowledge when trying to ensure enforcement of MPA
provisions throughout the healthcare system. Telemedicine poses
problems due to the varying definitions of the “practice of medicine”
across states.112 Additionally, each state has a medical board that im-
poses differing standards of conduct on physicians.113
Above all, the expanding avenues of unlicensed practice imposes
the harshest backlash on vulnerable classes of patients. Certain classes
of patients face risks with violators because of the circumstances they
are placed in, thus imposing a susceptibility to violators of the licens-
ing system.114 These vulnerable classes include psychological patients,
immigrant patients, and patients requiring pharmaceuticals. Psycho-
logical patients are susceptible because they put an immense amount
of trust into their physician’s hands—more trust than with a general
107. Phillips v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, No. 1–15–1284, 2016 WL 1066075 (Ill.
App. Ct. Mar. 16, 2016).
108. Id.
109. Pablo Lopez, Fresno doctor, three nurses in trouble for Botox injections and laser hair
removal, THE FRESNO BEE, http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/crime/article119849728.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
110. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3 (2014); see also FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at
5–6.
111. INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, supra note 76.
112. INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, supra note 76.
113. INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, supra note 76.
114. See, e.g., Senno v. Dep’t of Healthcare & Family Serv’s, 44 N.E.3d 1123,1126 (Ill. App.
2015) (charging a physician with seven counts of: inadequately treating a patient with congestive
heart failure; inadequately managing a patient with diabetes mellitus; prescribing antibiotics
without any clinical indication; improperly evaluating a patient with urethral discharge; improp-
erly prescribing medications; not addressing abnormal lab results; and not evaluating a patient
with a possible ulcer while the patient was taking nonsteroidal drugs).
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practitioner.115 Immigrants are especially susceptible to individuals
maneuvering around the licensing system. Immigrant patients are
often forced to avoid the healthcare system out of fear of deportation,
thus turning to healthcare offered under the radar.116 Faced with lim-
ited access to physicians, immigrants may lack knowledge of whether
the physician they turn to is properly licensed and whether the proce-
dures used are safe.117 Consequently, these patients are unknowingly
settling for care delivered by unlicensed physicians.118 Even more, un-
licensed physicians charge these vulnerable patients more than what
they would pay for traditional care.119 While these violators are pro-
viding a higher quality of care to these patients than they would get
without seeking treatment, the lack of proper licensure places these
patients in danger.120 Providing licensed practice to these patients
must be achieved in order to prevent patients from being injured.
C. Data on Unlicensed Practice in the U.S. and Illinois
Currently, the MPA is attempting to prevent unlicensed practice by
providing broad powers for prosecution.121 The IDFPR has success-
fully prosecuted many violators, yet its efforts to take a proactive step
in unlicensed practice and deter it remain unsuccessful. This begs the
question—How must the MPA be changed to better deter unlicensed
practice? Current enforcement measures for violation of the MPA in-
clude “termination of license, revocation, suspension, probation, rep-
rimand, and censure.”122 During the month of July 2015, IDFPR
reprimanded forty individuals for violating their license under the
115. See, e.g., Reddy v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 785 N.E.2d 876 (2002) (holding a physician
liable for “pronouncing his love” for his patient during a private therapy session to treat multiple
mental health issues); Ikpoh v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 789 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2003) (discussing
what the permissible reprimands are on a physician’s license who is convicted of sexual miscon-
duct with his patients).
116. Jan Hoffman, Sick and Afraid, Some Immigrants Forgo Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/health/undocumented-immigrants-health-care
.html; Eric Boodman, After Trump’s Immigration Crackdown, A Desert Clinic Tried to Save
Lives Without Breaking the Law, STAT NEWS (July 6, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/07/
06/immigration-desert-clinic/.
117. Hoffman, supra note 116; Jennifer Steinhauer, For Many Immigrants, a Health Care Sys-
tem Underground, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/20/nyregion/
for-many-immigrants-a-health-care-system-underground.html.
118. Steinhauer, supra note 117.
119. Steinhauer, supra note 117.
120. Steinhauer, supra note 117.
121. ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3.5 (2018).
122. Statewide Enforcement Section, ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. & PROF’L REGULATION, https://www
.idfpr.com/DPR/DPRSWE.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
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MPA.123 The types of violations included: (1) prescribing controlled
substances to a patient without proper evaluation and documentation;
(2) practicing with deficiencies in skill, knowledge, and judgment; (3)
committing healthcare or Medicare fraud; (4) executing a scheme to
obtain money from healthcare programs by submitting services that
were not performed; (5) putting minor patients in danger; (6) per-
forming surgery on incorrect body parts; (7) practicing with a
debilitating mental and physical illness; (8) delegating improperly; (9)
practicing medicine while under the influence; (10) failing to oversee
prescription medications; and (11) having improper relations with
patients.124
On average, IDFPR reprimands 30 individuals per month.125 Dur-
ing the past eight years, physician prosecution has remained prevalent
without fluctuating.126 There are about 4,000 to 4,500  physician prose-
cution actions in the U.S. per year.127 In 2015, there were a total of
1,238 individuals whose licenses were restricted, 655 individuals who
were put on probation, 594 individuals who were suspended, and 267
individuals whose licenses were revoked.128 When a license has been
restricted that means the physician’s ability to practice medicine is
limited (i.e., the physician loses prescribing privileges).129 A license
being put on probation is due to the need for the physician to be
monitored for a specified period.130 This probation data presented is
not solely from unlicensed practice because probation is also an ap-
propriate punishment for individuals committing Medicare fraud.131
Yet, the data presented in this section still exemplifies how prevalent
unlicensed practice is.
D. The Current Structure of MPA Prosecution
The current Illinois MPA provides a straightforward process of
prosecuting a complaint; however, it lacks any incentive to prompt
individuals to report a complaint. Once a private individual chooses to
123. News, ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. & PROF’L REGULATION, 8–11 https://www.idfpr.com/Forms/
DISCPLN/2015_07enf.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
124. Id.
125. Cf. id. In January 2017, the IDFPR reprimanded twenty-six individuals. Id. at 9–11. In
February 2017, twenty-four individuals. Id. at 15–17. In March 2017, twenty-eight individuals. Id.
at 19–21. In December 2017, thirty-seven individuals. Id. at 18–21. In January 2018, thirty-six
individuals. Id. at 10–13.
126. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 19–23.
127. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 19–23.
128. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 19–23.
129. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 19–23.
130. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 19–23.
131. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 19–23.
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file a complaint, the IDFPR analyzes the alleged violation using the
MPA to decide what the occurrence was and whether the occurrence
was in fact the unlawful practice of medicine.132 Private individuals
typically learn about the unlicensed practice once they research the
physician’s credentials and background.133 Patients should check a
physician’s qualifications to ensure that the physician they choose is
reputable. Individuals can check a physician’s qualifications through
their respective state’s website.134 Medical Boards typically include
websites known as “physician profiles” and provide records for viola-
tors that have been prosecuted in the past.135 The first indication of a
problem the individual should note is whether their physician is not on
the website or has a prior history of prosecution.136 Another impor-
tant step for patients to take in evaluating their healthcare provider is
to play an active role in their care.137 Being active includes asking
questions about your health and the physician’s suggested route for
care. The physician should be able to provide extensive information
about the procedure and why the procedure is the recommended
route.138 A lack of reasoning for the recommended route is another
red flag in considering what physician to choose.
Once reported, the IDFPR first determines whether the occurrence
would constitute grounds for discipline under the MPA, in other
words whether it is the “practice of medicine.”139 After determining
that the occurrence was the unlawful practice of medicine, the IDFPR
must then put the accused on notice of the alleged transgression and
that hearings will follow.140 If the IDFPR can prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the accused violated the MPA, the IDFPR can
employ various disciplinary actions.141 Generally, the IDFPR will or-
der a cease and desist of the unlicensed practice and charge a civil
penalty.142 However, the civil penalty for an offense may not exceed
ten thousand dollars.143 Additionally, the MPA permits information
132. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22 (2018).
133. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 9.
134. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 9.
135. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 9.
136. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 9.
137. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 9.
138. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11, at 9.
139. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22 (2018); see also 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/9(B)(4) (2018) (“The
Licensing Board may condition or restrict any license, subject to the same terms and conditions
as are provided for the Disciplinary Board under Section 22 of this Act.”).
140. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/36 (2018).
141. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22; Reddy v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 785 N.E.2d 876, 877
(2002); Ikpoh v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 789 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2003).
142. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22; Reddy, 785 N.E.2d at 878 (2002); Ikpoh, 789 N.E.2d at 445.
143. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3.5(a) (2011).
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from the proceedings to be disclosed to federal, state, or local law
enforcement agencies; therefore, subsequent criminal or civil actions
against the accused may follow.144 If those proceedings do follow, the
court may impose criminal and civil charges on the individual after
hearing the case.145 The charged individual also has the ability to ap-
peal IDFPR’s findings to federal, state, or local law enforcement
agencies either to reverse the IDFPR findings or to adjust the severity
of the sanctions.146 The Illinois MPA has dedicated a great amount of
effort towards stopping unlicensed practice; however, the goal of ex-
clusively licensed medical practice remains sought after.
The regulations discussed above are not deterring unlicensed prac-
tice. For example, in Reddy v. Department of Professional Regulations,
a doctor professed his love for his patient during a treatment session,
moved her into his home, and married the patient.147 The physician
was treating the woman for various mental health issues.148 The
IDFPR instituted a complaint against the physician under the MPA
seeking to sanction him for the misconduct.149 In this case, it was clear
to the IDFPR and the court that the physician’s behavior was unethi-
cal, unprofessional, and exceeded the scope of his license.150 However,
the physician’s license was only placed on probation for six months
with minor restrictions of the physician’s practice.151
Another example occurred in 2016, in Jackson v. State of Connecti-
cut Department of Public Health.152 The plaintiff claimed she held a
license through the “American Nedicine Licensing Board, Inc.”153 She
claimed this licensing board was “‘an organization authorized by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office to license an individual as
a Doctor of Nedicine, N.D.,’” which had registered a certification
mark, “Doctor of Nedicine,” with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office.154 The “Nedicine” Board issued licenses to individuals,
144. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT 60/36(e) (2014) (“All information gathered by the Department dur-
ing its investigation . . . shall be kept for the confidential use . . . except that the Department may
disclose information and documents to a federal, State, or local law enforcement agency . . . .”).
145. Reddy, 785 N.E.2d, at 877.
146. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT 60/41 (2014).
147. Reddy, 785 N.E.2d, at 877.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 879.
151. Id. at 877 (inferring that, after six months, the physician can continue his or her unli-
censed practice).
152. Jackson v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 3:15-CV-750 (CSH) 2016 WL 3460304, at *1 (D.
Conn. June 20, 2016).
153. Id.
154. Id. at *3.
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like the plaintiff, for diagnosing ailments, treating patients, and prac-
ticing alternative medicine.155 The plaintiff undertook treatment of a
patient with a brain tumor, and the plaintiff directly caused a delay in
the patient receiving treatment with the physicians who diagnosed the
tumor.156 This delay caused the patient’s tumor to increase in size,
producing detrimental effects on the patient’s health.157 The Connecti-
cut Department of Public Health began an investigation of the plain-
tiff in 2013; however, the plaintiff then brought suit demanding the
investigation end.158 The court held the plaintiff was not entitled to
her license simply due to the trademark and the plaintiff failed to
comprehend that the trademark is not a license for her to practice
medicine.159 The court then dismissed plaintiff’s claims and provided
no additional oversight of the plaintiff to ensure her practice no longer
continued.160 Thus, with only a six-month suspension, physicians are
likely not fearful of unlicensed practice prosecution.
Further, in 2016, in Wen Xuan v. Illinois Department of Financial
and Professional Regulation, an acupuncturist appealed IDFPR’s
charge of unlicensed practice of medicine.161 The plaintiff exceeded
the scope of his acupuncturist license by representing himself as a
medical doctor on his business card, stationery, billing statements, and
office signage.162 He suggested to one patient to stop taking medically
prescribed drugs for congestive heart failure, high blood pressure, and
a heart arrhythmia.163 The IDFPR and a civil court sanctioned appro-
priate fines for the individual. However, the MPA prosecutorial pro-
cess lasted for five years, meaning that during this time the plaintiff
was able to continue his practice.164 This exemplifies that the current
MPA does not prevent ex ante unlicensed practice. In Reddy, Wen
Xuan, and Jackson the plaintiffs were not deterred from their unli-
censed practice.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *3.
158. Jackson, 2016 WL 3460304, at *3–4.
159. Id. at *19.
160. Id.
161. Xuan v. Ill. Dep’t. of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, No. 1-14-3949, 2016 WL 5724222, at *1
(Ill. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016).
162. Id.
163. Id. at *2–3.
164. Id. at *1–4.
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E. The History and Breakdown of the False Claims Act
In 1863, the False Claims Act (the FCA) was enacted due to con-
cerns throughout the Civil War that suppliers were defrauding the
government.165 In the face of a growing federal deficit and fears of
contractors defrauding the government, Congress amended the FCA
and created incentives by allowing private individuals to bring their
own actions against fraudsters.166 When a private individual brings a
claim against an alleged violator, the action is called a qui tam action.
The term qui tam is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur,” meaning, “he who prosecutes for himself
as well as for the King.”167 In 1986, the FCA implemented qui tam
actions for healthcare as one of the biggest steps toward combatting
fraud in federally funded programs.168 Congress created the qui tam
action in response to the government lacking the proper oversight ca-
pabilities to prevent corrupt actors from financially harming the gov-
ernment by taking healthcare funds that the government had provided
to programs.169 Qui tam actions provide an incentive for private indi-
viduals to share their information with the government. The qui tam
also allows the government to return billions of dollars to the health-
care programs.170
165. See Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27. States also have their own FCA qui tam actions. See,
e.g., 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 175/1 et seq. (2018).
In 1991, the State of Illinois adopted the Illinois False Claims Act . . . its own version of
the federal False Claims Act. . . . The Illinois FCA prohibits false claims against the
State of Illinois and allows private individuals who know about fraud against the Illinois
state government to bring a qui tam case against the offending party on behalf of the
State. Like the FCA, the Illinois FCA offers financial rewards. . . . If the State decides
to intervene in a case, the whistleblower may receive 15-25% of the recovery. If the
State does not intervene and the whistleblower pursues the case on their own, they may
receive 25-30% of any eventual recovery.
Illinois False Claims Act, BERGER MONTAGUE, PC, https://bergermontague.com/illinois-false-
claims-act/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2018). “The State of Illinois has its own False Claims Act, which
generally follows the provisions of the federal law. . . .” Qui Tam, CHI. OVERTIME LAW CTR.,
https://www.chicagoovertimelawyer.com/qui-tam.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). With this in
mind, the scope of this article will be discussing the FCA within the federal government context.
166. See Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 2001).
167. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25, at 2 (italics omitted).
168. Saskia de Melker, Top Payouts to Federal False Claims Whistleblowers in Fiscal Year
2014, PUB. BROAD. SYS. (Dec. 21, 2014, 1:24 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/fortune-
fraud-top-5-biggest-payouts-federal-whistleblowers-2014; Mark S. David, The Effects of False
Claims Act Whistleblowers on the Pharmaceutical Industry, DIG. ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT
HARVARD, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8965590/Davis06.pdf?sequence=1 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2017).
169. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25, at 6–7.
170. See Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
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The FCA focuses on claims for Medicare and Medicaid violations,
Anti-Kickback Statute, Stark Law, up-coding, and submitting claims
for services that were not rendered.171 These all involve fraudulent
billing. The FCA imposes liability on:
[A]ny person who—
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraud-
ulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D),
(E), (F), (G);
. . . or
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the Government.172
The FCA has remained significant in its scope through amendments
such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the
ACA).173 In recent years, the ACA has aggressively targeted health-
care abuse.174 In fact, the qui tam has accounted for $40 billion recov-
ered under the FCA, and in 2011 alone $4 billion was recovered.175
Claims against alleged violators can be brought by either the Depart-
ment of Justice, private individuals, or both.176 When a private indi-
vidual brings a qui tam claim, they are given the title relator.177 The
relator will stand in place of the government and file a complaint. An
individual must file the complaint in compliance with three require-
ments: (1) the individual filing the claim is the “original source” of the
knowledge of the alleged fraud; (2) the individual filing the claim is
the first to file the claim; and (3) the alleged fraud has not already
been publicly disclosed.178 The complaint will remain under seal and
the government will investigate the claim for sixty days to determine
whether to intervene and join the case.179 After the investigation is
complete, the government can either “(i) intervene in the case and
171. Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
172. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
173. See Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
174. Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
175. Garrett, supra note 34, at 771.
176. See Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
177. Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
178. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2012).
179. See Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
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assume control over the suit, or (ii) decline to intervene and allow the
relator to continue to pursue his or her claims.”180
If the government declines to intervene, and the relator chooses to
pursue the action alone, the case will be unsealed and the relator
could receive between twenty-five to thirty percent of the recovery.181
Whereas when the government joins the case, the relator could re-
ceive between fifteen to twenty-five percent.182 Qui tam actions pro-
vide high financial incentive for individuals whether the government
intervenes or not. The FCA permits a maximum penalty of ten thou-
sand dollars for each offense and allows for treble damages.183 The
treble damages provision permits the court to consider the amount of
damages calculated, multiply this amount by three, and award the re-
sulting figure.184 The qui tam suit under the FCA provides sufficient
fines to deter individuals from defrauding the government, and it may
produce the same deterrent effect for individuals practicing without a
license. The FCA is the primary tool in fighting fraud and refunding
money to the healthcare system; however, unlicensed practice slips
through the cracks of the FCA.185
In 2015, the Supreme Court in Universal Health Services, Inc. v.
United States, decided a case against a mental health clinic after the
relator’s daughter died of a seizure when various unlicensed and un-
supervised staff treated her.186 In 2013, the Massachusetts state agency
punished only one of the physicians at the clinic with a penalty of one
thousand dollars.187 Afterwards, the relators filed a qui tam action
against the defendant clinic and obtained justice by the Supreme
Court.188 However, this case presents the anomaly within the FCA.189
Only after nearly twenty years of multiple providers practicing with-
out a license, did the government stop the clinic’s unlicensed practice.
Is there a solution that will deter unlicensed practice before harm is
180. Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
181. Mitchell, supra note 38, at 27.
182. United States v. N.Y. Soc’y for the Relief of the Ruptured & Crippled, Maintaining the
Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 07 Civ. 292 (PKC), 2014 WL 3905742, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,
2014).
183. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc’y, 2014 WL 3905742; Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
186. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1993.
187. United States v. Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d 504, 510 (1st Cir. 2015).
188. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1993.
189. Id. The anomaly being that the FCA was designed to prevent fraud within the healthcare
system, yet if it happens to catch unlicensed practice too, it will only be after a physician has
been unlawfully practicing for such a long period of time that he or she has incurred and con-
cealed thousands of dollars from the government and the government notices.
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done? Must patients wait for the financial harm to the government to
be great enough to grab its attention? Should officials start consider-
ing other solutions involving private citizens focused on proactively
deterring unlicensed practice?
In United States. ex rel. Putnam v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical
Center, a relator initiated suit against the defendant who worked with
child speech services.190 The relator alleged the defendant fraudu-
lently submitted claims to Medicare and Medicaid.191 Specifically, the
defendant used unlicensed aides to provide services to Medicare and
Medicaid patients, and the defendant knowingly and fraudulently
billed both programs for the work performed by the aides.192 In 1997,
the defendant began a speech pathology practice and hired aides to
help provide service to patients.193 From 2003 to 2007, the defendant
began billing for services provided by these aides in violation of Medi-
care and Medicaid requirements.194 The relator disclosed the defen-
dant’s practices to the Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW)
and asked them to begin an investigation of the defendant’s prac-
tice.195 The relator sent the IDHW multiple letters describing the de-
fendant’s unlawful practice.196 The IDHW began an investigation.197
The investigation was centered on the billing practices for the fiscal
years of 2003 to 2007 and the individuals responsible for the fraudu-
lent billing.198 The relator initiated the qui tam claim in 2007; in 2010
the court found the presence of fraudulent claims and prosecuted the
individuals that conducted the false billing.199 However, the defendant
was able to practice for thirteen years with unlicensed aides, thus
showing a lack of deterrence from the unlicensed practice.
In United States v. New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured
and Crippled, a relator brought a qui tam action asserting that starting
in 1986 the hospital “orchestrated several long-running schemes to de-
fraud Medicare and Medicaid” by seeking reimbursement for proce-
dures performed and improperly billed by two unlicensed radiology
190. United States. ex rel. Putnam v. E. Idaho Reg’l Med. Ctr., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1192 (D.
Idaho 2010).
191. Id.
192. Id.at 1194.
193. Id. at 1193.
194. Id. at 1199.
195. Id. at 1193–94.
196. United States ex rel. Putnam v. E. Idaho Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. CIV. 07-192 E-BLW, 2009
WL 2901233, at *3–4 (D. Idaho Sept. 8, 2009).
197. Id. at *4.
198. United States. ex rel. Putnam v. E. Idaho Reg’l Med. Ctr., 696 F.Supp.2d at 1194.
199. Id. at 1205.
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facilities.200 The relator alleged that the hospital fraudulently claimed
$788 million of government money during their long-running
scheme.201 The relator brought the action in 2007.202 However, it was
not until 2013 that the government declined to intervene; and in 2014
the relator’s claims were dismissed for lack of proper pleading.203 In
this case, the defendant continued to put patients in danger by practic-
ing almost twenty-one years without a license, followed by six more
years of delay by the federal government. After twenty-one years of
putting patients in danger, should officials start considering ex ante
solutions that will incentivize private individuals to report unlicensed
practice, thus imposing fear onto violators and providing the needed
deterrence?
F. Background of Incentive Schemes Within Intellectual Property
The intellectual property system and the prize system have long
been considered as the two main incentive schemes for innovation.
Intellectual property emerged as early as the 1400’s and spread
throughout the world by the eighteenth century.204 As it evolved, criti-
cism developed due to the “monopolistic characteristic” that the intel-
lectual property system imposed on the economy.205 The system
ultimately imposed high prices on products and hindered subsequent
innovations due to restricting their uses for others’ innovations.206
Consequently, the prize system evolved as an alternative method to
spur innovation.207 Intellectual property concentrates on protecting
innovations, whereas the prize system concentrates on incentivizing
innovation by allowing the public to use the innovations. Because only
a few recent papers discuss the prize system, it has been labelled as
the “neglected innovation incentive.”208 However, this system is supe-
rior in the sense that it incentivizes innovations and avoids social
losses.209 Under the prize system, the government “gives a reward to
the innovator if he succeeds with an innovation,” then, unlike the in-
200. United States v. N.Y. Soc’y for the Relief of the Ruptured & Crippled, Maintaining the
Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 07 Civ. 292 (PKC), 2014 WL 3905742, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,
2014).
201. Id. at *1.
202. Id. at *7.
203. Id.
204. Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.
LAW & ECON. 525, 526 (2001).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 526–27.
208. Roin, supra note 43, at 1022; Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 526.
209. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 526–27.
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tellectual property system, the innovation is made available to the
public.210 Hence, the incentive to innovate is “due entirely to the re-
ward.”211 Setting the reward at the perfect price is of concern; how-
ever, determining such a reward would not “prove
insurmountable.”212
The prize system’s rationale is that providing individuals with the
proper incentives to innovate is for the good of all, and this “for all”
includes the government. As Brian Wright and Suzanne Scotchmer
suggest, the incentive to innovate is good for the government because
innovators “possess superior information to the government.”213 Thus,
the government can only benefit from tapping into a private individ-
ual’s information and incentivizing these individuals to come forward
with such information.214 Tapping into a private individual’s informa-
tion is essential in the case of innovations. Scotchmer suggests that
private information is useful, but only when used efficiently.215 The
intellectual property system does not use private information effi-
ciently because it creates patent races.216 The races cause research and
development to be duplicated due to the private nature of the sys-
tem.217 Under the prize system, this inefficient use of private informa-
tion would not occur. There is no race to discover the innovation first
because the information discovered and rewarded is then made public
and others have access to it. The innovation information would be
publicized and whatever subsequent value private individuals could
add to it would be rewarded. Further, if this efficiency is great enough,
Scotchmer suggests that a reward system may be optimal compared to
an intellectual property system.218
Wright states that a private individual’s information can provide
value to the government, however, he also suggests that quantifying
this value is challenging.219 The government would need the ability to
set the “perfect” price in valuing how important the information is (its
210. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
211. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
212. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528.
213. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528 (citing Brian Wright, The Economics of Inven-
tion Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983)); Suzanne
Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. ECON. 181 (1999).
214. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528(citing Wright, supra note 213); Scotchmer,
supra note 213).
215. Scotchmer, supra note 213, at 181.
216. Scotchmer, supra note 213, at 181.
217. Scotchmer, supra note 213, at 181.
218. Scotchmer, supra note 213, at 191.
219. Wright, supra note 213, at 703.
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social value).220 Facing this challenge involves the moral hazard of the
government undervaluing the innovation from the viewpoint of the
private individual.221 Yet, this burden is considerably higher within the
intellectual property system than within the prize system because the
intellectual property system values the innovation before its social
value is discovered.222 On the other hand, the prize system values the
innovation after it is on the market and its social value is objectively
determined.223 In the prize system, the incentive to invest in research
is based on the reward the individual would receive.224 The system
provides greater incentivizes to the individuals who research innova-
tions that the government views as important. Under this system, it
follows that by setting the reward at the perfect price, the individual
would choose the best investment in research and the government
would achieve the best outcome.225 However, setting the perfect price
that will incentivize individuals, recoup research losses, and benefit
the government depends on the sufficiency of the information that the
government has about the value of the innovation.226
Consequently, the drawback within the prize system is the difficulty
to set the perfect price without “knowledge of consumers’ willingness
to pay.”227 This lack of knowledge is due to the prize system being
public, rather than private, thus losing the ability to estimate monopo-
listic cost margins. The lack of consumer knowledge also makes set-
ting a perfect price difficult without corruption or incompetence.228
The benefit of the intellectual property system is its ability to offer
incentive prizes that are valued based on the market of consumers’
willingness to pay.229 Intellectual property is appreciated because it
carries valuable information about consumers; however, it is flawed
due to the ex ante undervaluing of innovation.230
In the prize system, once the market reaction quantifies the innova-
tion and a reward is disbursed, the innovation is available to competi-
220. Wright, supra note 213, at 703. The perfect price is a price that will motivate individuals
to innovate and recoup research costs, while still motivating the government to provide the re-
ward. See Wright, supra note 213, at 695 n.7.
221. See Wright, supra note 213, at 703.
222. Wright, supra note 213, at 703.
223. Wright, supra note 213, at 703.
224. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 529.
225. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
226. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 536.
227. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018 (emphasis omitted).
228. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018.
229. Roin, supra note 43, at 1001.
230. Wright, supra note 213, at 703.
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tors with zero dead weight loss.231 “Dead weight loss” is defined as the
loss of economic efficiency in terms of the utility for consumers.232
Within the intellectual property system, new innovators lack public
access to innovation information; this creates a gap in the system
known as dead weight loss. Dead weight loss has been considered the
intellectual property system’s biggest drawback and the benefit of the
prize system has been viewed as its “ability to avoid it.”233
Outside of the prize system, incentives for private individuals to in-
vest in new ideas are typically inadequate. This is due to both the “in-
tangibility of ideas” as well as the risk and expense that the innovation
could fail, which are unavoidable.234 Without the prize system, the risk
and expense of failure may prevent innovators from innovating. Addi-
tionally, “‘knowledge spillovers’ generated by a successful invention”
that will prevent reward payouts deter innovators.235 The derivative
benefits from the knowledge spillover go unrewarded, and the “inabil-
ity of competitive markets to adequately compensate and incentivize
their creation” without the prize system becomes problematic.236
Setting an incentive for private individuals to innovate is good for
the government because innovators “possess superior information to
the government.”237 Rewarding individuals who come forward with
private information is beneficial for the government because it can
then obtain knowledge not otherwise available.238 A prize system is
optimal compared to an intellectual property system because it pro-
vides private information without concealing it from the public.239 If
the price is right, the prize system provides greater incentivizes for
individuals to put research into innovations that the government views
as important. The prize system could be available as a proactive solu-
tion that will incentivize private individuals to report unlicensed
practice.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the need for reform in the Illinois MPA. Faced
with impractical solutions to unlicensed practice, Illinois needs a new
231. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 529.
232. Definition of ‘Deadwight Loss,’ THE ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes
.com/definition/deadweight-loss (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
233. Roin, supra note 43, at 1023.
234. Roin, supra note 43, at 1023.
235. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018.
236. Roin, supra note 43, at 1019.
237. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528 (citing Wright, supra note 213).
238. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018.
239. Roin, supra note 43, at 1008–09.
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system for protecting patients and deterring unlicensed practice viola-
tions. The new system required should incentivize individuals to re-
port unlicensed practice and in turn, deter violators, thus protecting
patients. First, this section will challenge other options to deterring
unlicensed practice and explain their downfalls. Next, this analysis will
explore whether qui tam actions are a viable option for incentivizing
private individuals to report unlicensed practice. Finally, this section
will explore why a prize scheme would likely be the best system to
incentivize private individuals to report unlicensed practice and to de-
ter unlicensed practice.
A. Medical Malpractice Is Not an Option
Medical malpractice is an important consolation for patients that
have been injured by physicians. However, complaints to the IDFPR
are more omnipresent; some states report that the number of claims
brought by the respective licensing board are four times greater than
the number of malpractice claims.240 Additionally, “a complaint to the
board is . . . potentially more dangerous than a malpractice filing.”241
Medical malpractice claims are difficult to file, expensive to try, ex-
pose the complainant to the defendant, promote unfair settlement,
and—most importantly—require a patient to first be injured.242 Thus,
many plaintiffs are swayed from filing a malpractice claim.243
An ex ante deterrence is preferable to an ex post medical malprac-
tice claim. It is much easier for private citizens to report to the IDFPR
rather than to file a medical malpractice claim.244 To report a claim
with the IDFPR, individuals simply have to fill out a form online;
whereas malpractice claims require individuals to hire a lawyer, pay
the massive costs of gathering evidence and assembling experts, and
endure trial.245 Even finding a lawyer to agree to prosecute a malprac-
tice claim can be difficult.246 Additionally, when an individual chooses
240. Leigh Page, The Black Cloud of a Medical Board Investigation, MEDSCAPE, https://www
.medscape.com/viewarticle/853911_2 (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. Marshal Allen & Olga Pierce, Ten Patient Stories: When Attorneys Refused My Medical
Malpractice Case, PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/article/ten-patient-stories-when-at-
torneys-refused-my-medical-malpractice-case (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). This proved all too
true for Jeanine Thomas. Id. Ms. Thomas had surgery on her ankle and contracted a deadly
bacterial infection that required several more operations and almost five more years of recovery.
Id. Ms. Thomas was unable to find a malpractice attorney willing to file her claim due to the lack
of profitability for the attorney. Id. Ms. Thomas’s story demonstrates how expensive these claims
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to report a complaint with the IDFPR, the defendant will not know
who the complainant is; whereas when filing a malpractice claim, the
complainant must be prepared to face the defendant.247 Moreover, de-
fendants that have claims brought against them by the IDFPR often
settle the charges to prevent a trial.248 Even more so, filing a valid
claim with the IDFPR does not require an injury, whereas a patient
will not have a valid malpractice claim without first being injured.249
Private citizens can report to the IDFPR when a physician has com-
mitted unlicensed practice by performing any of the following acts:
exceeding the scope of their license, delegating duties improperly, or
practicing corporate medicine.250 However, medical malpractice
shines in its ability to compensate for the injury, as compared to re-
ports filed under the MPA where the complainant receives no mone-
tary reward.251 Introducing the qui tam action or the prize system
would provide a monetary reward for catching the unlicensed practice
and protecting patients. Medical malpractice claims may provide some
deterrence, however, this Note argues for preventing unlicensed prac-
tice before a patient is injured. Put another way, the continuance of
patients getting injured by unlicensed practice suggests that malprac-
tice claims are not a deterrence at all.
B. Stricter Fines and More Funding are Not Viable Options
Implementing stricter fines on violators or enhancing the current
governmental resources would not effectively deter unlicensed prac-
tice; thus, neither of these options would keep patients safe. Violators
will not fear higher fines for practicing without a license because unli-
censed practice remains prevalent even when threatened with the
FCA fines, which can be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.252
Additionally, if the IDFPR received more funding to be allocated to-
wards enhanced resources for catching unlicensed practice, it would
not prevent unlicensed practice. Both a continuation of the current
are to prosecute and the difficulty in finding representation—a common problem in malpractice
claims. Id.
247. Page, supra note 240. This is an added disadvantage to medical malpractice because
sometimes the violator to whom the individual is reporting will be their employer. See Page,
supra note 240.
248. Page, supra note 240.
249. Page, supra note 240.
250. See supra Part II.B.
251. Page, supra note 240; see also 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22(A) (2018) (“Any funds col-
lected from such fines [assessed for violating the MPA] shall be deposited in the Illinois State
Medical Disciplinary Fund,” rather than paid to a complaining patient).
252. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25. Under the FCA authorities have paid average
reward payouts of approximately $1.5 million. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
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resources and a potential expansion of funding towards those same
resources are inferior, compared to the private information that indi-
viduals obtain through their role as patients.253 Enhancing the same,
inferior resources will not improve the system. The government needs
to tap into new resources in order to prevent unlicensed practice. Pa-
tients have better access to information on violators than the govern-
ment, and adding more personnel will likely not change this.254
The IDFPR’s current funding for prosecuting unlicensed practice is
appropriated through the fees collected from issuing medical li-
censes.255 If within any year, the fees and fines generated by the medi-
cal profession are insufficient to finance any necessary costs of
regulating the profession, the remainder of those costs will be fi-
nanced from appropriations from sources “other than fees and
fines.”256 Thus, the board257 is only permitted to receive additional
funding if the current funds are not enough to cover the costs of regu-
lating the profession. The board lacks  budgetary authority to allocate
funds for itself towards fining unlicensed practice.258 The board is not
independently authorized to budget for itself.259 The board neither
drafts its own budget nor approves of its own budget.260 The board is
not even authorized to advise on determining the budget.261 Moreo-
ver, the budget is not reviewed annually.262 It is unlikely that the Illi-
nois legislature will expend more money towards the board to be used
for preventing unlicensed practice.263 This is even more unlikely when
253. See Roin, supra note 43, at 1008–10, 1027 (finding private citizens have superior informa-
tion than the government).
254. Id.; see also supra notes 68–69 (discussing that the government agency has investigatory
resources). However, government resources will never be superior to private citizen resources in
low visibility crimes. See infra note 297; see also infra note 371 and accompanying text.
255. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2105/2105-300 (2017). “Appropriations for the direct and alloca-
ble indirect costs of licensing and regulating each regulated profession . . . are intended to be
payable from the fees and fines that are assessed and collected from that profession.” Id.
256. Id.
257. “‘Board’ means the board of persons designated for a profession, trade, or occupation
under the provisions of any Act now or hereafter in force whereby the jurisdiction of that profes-
sion, trade, or occupation is devolved on the Department [of Professional Regulation].” 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 2105/2105-5 (2017).
258. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11.
259. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11.
260. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11.
261. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11.
262. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 11.
263. The Illinois legislature has struggled to pass a budget since 2015. See Kim Geiger &
Monique Garcia, Illinois lawmakers get closer to avoiding another long showdown as Senate ad-
vances budget, CHI. TRIBUNE, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-met-illinois-
legislature-budget-votes-20180530-story.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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considering the government’s hesitance towards implementing the qui
tam action due to the lack of financial incentive.264
The government has an interest in patients receiving proper health-
care; however, it is unlikely to allocate funds toward deterring unli-
censed practice because the government is not financially harmed by
unlicensed practice.265 Without a significant harm, the government is
not likely to appropriate funds towards current enforcement.266 What
is more, settling on a budgetary agreement is already complicated
enough without the additional goal of preventing unlicensed prac-
tice.267 Without incentivizing private individuals to report unlicensed
practice, the government will not otherwise have access to such pri-
vate information on this low-visibility violation.268 Implementing a
new system of incentives can be funded by carving such incentives out
of the current fines imposed on violators. This will not require the
government to pass a new budget and will not require the board to
implement a new policy. They are permitted to use the current fines
for regulating the medical profession, which includes preventing unli-
censed practice.
Harsher fines will not provide the government with private individ-
ual information on this low-visibility crime.269 Violators in the health-
care system are not currently deterred by any level of fine, evidenced
by the fact that they are still committing these violations. Additional
state funding for additional resources will not provide an effective de-
terrence to unlicensed practice because the government will still not
have the advantage of private citizen information. The incentive sys-
tem will not have the downfalls present in the alternative option of
imposing harsher fines and providing additional state funding. The in-
centive system requires no passage of legislation and no additional
funding. The board has the authority to use already allocated funds
towards medical license violations. Therefore, the board can choose to
carve out a portion of such funds for individuals sharing their private
information.
264. See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text.
265. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
266. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
267. See Illinois House approves state budget, ends historic impasse, ABC 7 EYEWITNESS NEWS,
http://abc7chicago.com/politics/illinois-house-approves-state-budget-ends-historic-impasse/21879
33/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
268. Garrett, supra note 34, at 785 (“Despite this inherent difficulty [to detect low-visibility
crimes], qui tam provisions have proven themselves undeniably successful in uncovering and
prosecuting fraud.”).
269. Garrett, supra note 34, at 784 (“[A] qui tam provision is an excellent regulatory tool for
detecting and prosecuting low-visibility crimes . . . .”).
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C. Qui Tam Suits for Unlicensed Practice
This section discusses whether adding an FCA-like qui tam enforce-
ment provision to the Illinois MPA would help incentivize individuals
to report unlicensed practice and hence, deter it. While the FCA is a
crucial tool in fighting fraud in healthcare,270 unlicensed practice con-
tinues to fly under its radar until the violator submits a sufficient num-
ber of false claims to catch the government’s attention. This analysis
considers whether adding a qui tam provision to the Illinois MPA to
incentivize the reporting of unlicensed practice would mirror the suc-
cess the FCA has in reporting fraudulent billing. This section goes on
to discuss why other areas of law are moving towards implementing
qui tam actions and explains the concerns of implementation. Finally,
this section explores whether unlicensed practice is harmful enough to
the government to justify adding a qui tam provision to the Illinois
MPA.
Qui tam suits in the MPA would proactively prevent harm to pa-
tients. The deterrence would provide a proactive solution to prevent-
ing harm to patients by enforcing the MPA before patients are
injured. By providing an incentive for private individuals to report un-
licensed practice, violators are deterred from unlicensed practice out
of fear of being reported by patients.271 Qui tam suits allow reporting
individuals to obtain up to 25% of proceeds the government collects
from the lawsuit.272 Hence, the incentive to report would originate
from the possibility of obtaining a portion of those proceeds. When
the FCA adopted the qui tam provision, individuals were motivated to
come forward because the government rewarded those individuals
with a percentage of the financial earnings of the suit.273 Since the
implementation of the qui tam provision, the amount of claims the
government has prosecuted under the FCA has substantially in-
creased.274 In utilizing qui tam actions under the MPA, private individ-
uals would be incentivized to come forward and report unlicensed
practice with the potential of receiving a hefty portion of the pro-
270. See generally John T. Boese, Use of the False Claims Act to Enforce Federal Regulations:
Necessary Limits on False Certification Cases Brought Under the Civil False Claims Act,
ENVRTL., MASS TORTS & PRODS. LIAB. LITIG. COMMS.’ JOINT CLE SEMINAR, https://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2015-joint-cle/written_materials/
02_what_you_don%27t_know_could_hurt_you_an_examination.authcheckdam.pdf (last viewed
Dec. 1, 2017); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1989 (2016).
271. David, supra note 168; Division of Professional Regulation, ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. & PROF’L
REGULATION, https://www.idfpr.com/Admin/Complaints.asp, (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
272. See Vogel, supra note 27.
273. Melker, supra note 168; David, supra note 168.
274. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
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ceeds. More people will want the opportunity to reap the benefits of a
winning lawsuit, hence, the number of unlicensed practice claims will
increase, as seen in fraud claims under the FCA.275 As more claims
are brought, more violators will be caught, and violators will finally be
deterred from unlicensed practice out of fear of being prosecuted. The
FCA implemented the qui tam suit as one of the biggest steps toward
combatting fraud in healthcare.276 By adopting the same scheme, the
MPA could transform the current, insufficient protections against the
unlicensed practice of medicine. Qui tam claims under the MPA could
fix the lack of incentives under the MPA and permit the IDFPR to
finally deter unlicensed practice.
Additionally, the MPA could prevent the time lag of the FCA qui
tam claims. The FCA occasionally, and derivatively, catches unli-
censed practice in investigating fraudulent billing; however, it takes a
longer period to do so and thus results in more patients being in-
jured.277 The MPA’s adoption of a qui tam provision would share
many commonalities with the FCA qui tam provision. Yet, the current
differences between the two Acts are glaring. The current MPA does
not provide a financial incentive for private individuals to give the
IDFPR their private information on the violator, while the FCA qui
tam action does provide such an incentive.278 The MPA discovers unli-
censed practice sooner because of its focus on licenses, while the FCA
qui tam action can take up to twenty years.279 Implementing a qui tam
action under the MPA could catch unlicensed practice sooner than
under the FCA and thus better protect patients.
In Reddy v. Department of Professional Regulation, IDFPR prose-
cuted the violator under the MPA after five years of his unlawful prac-
tice.280 Whereas, in United States v. New York Society for the Relief of
the Ruptured and Crippled, the United States prosecuted the violators
under the FCA after twenty-one years of practicing.281 If the qui tam
action in New York Society would have been brought by a state
agency, the unlicensed practice could have been caught sooner like in
Reddy. The government presumably could have avoided sixteen years
275. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
276. Melker, supra note 168.
277. See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016); United
States. ex rel. Putnam v. E. Idaho Reg’l Med. Ctr., 696 F.Supp.2d 1190 (D. Idaho 2010); United
States v. N.Y. Soc’y for the Relief of the Ruptured & Crippled, Maintaining the Hosp. for Spe-
cial Surgery, No. 07 Civ. 292 (PKC), 2014 WL 3905742 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014).
278. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
279. N.Y. Soc’y, 2014 WL 3905742 (showing an example of a FCA qui tam action taking
twenty years to catch unlicensed practice).
280. Reddy v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 336 Ill. App. 3d 350, 352 (2002).
281. See N. Y. Soc’y, 2014 WL 3905742, at *2.
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of risk to patient safety. The MPA has a more concentrated frame-
work than the FCA, allowing the IDFPR to research, investigate, and
prosecute unlicensed practice quicker than the FCA can, thus protect-
ing more patients. Adding a qui tam provision to the MPA would
avoid the time lag experienced in FCA prosecution and incentivize
private individuals to report unlicensed practice.282 Thus, deterring vi-
olators and keeping patients safe.
The implementation of qui tam actions is expanding into other ar-
eas of law for similar reasons, including (1) providing government
with private information not otherwise available and (2) obtaining
such information faster. For example, qui tam actions have been con-
sidered under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).283 In United States ex rel.
Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York v. Westchester County,
citizens claimed the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH)
group reported false FHA claims to the government about the status
of Westchester’s housing market in order to receive more government
funds.284 Westchester implemented the FHA to prevent housing mar-
ket discrimination by local and national government authorities.285
The AFFH group was employed to further prevent discrimination;
however, after the group’s enforcement was called into question,
scholars started to wonder if the FCA would provide a viable alterna-
tive for enforcing fair housing.286 The discriminated citizens did not
have the ability to bring direct suits against the AFFH officers for
violating their duty to promote fair housing, so the citizens brought an
FCA qui tam action against the AFFH for the false claims about the
fair housing market the group submitted to the government.287 The
plaintiffs won $62.5 million in settlement.288 The qui tam action was
the chosen litigation route because it would help deter future officers
in the AFFH from violating their duty out of fear of being reported by
the citizens and facing similar liability.289
282. Garrett, supra note 34, at 767.
283. Matthew J. Termine, Promoting Residential Integration through the Fair Housing Act: Are
Quit Tam Actions a Viable Method of Enforcing Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Viola-
tions, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367 (2010).
284. Termine, supra note 283, at 1370–71 (citing United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr.
of Metro N.Y. v. Westchester Cty., No. 06 Civ. 02860 (DLC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009)). The government would obtain more funds if it could show it was
following the anti-discrimination laws. Id.
285. Termine, supra note 283, at 1404.
286. Termine, supra note 283, at 1371.
287. Termine, supra note 283, at 1371.
288. Termine, supra note 283, at 1369.
289. Termine, supra note 283, at 1426.
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Like violations of the AFFH, the MPA does not currently provide
citizens with the ability of bringing a private action. More so, the
AFFH does not provide a deterrence for individuals breaking the fair
housing rules, and the MPA also does not provide a deterrence for
individuals breaking the licensure rules. The qui tam suit brought to
enforce the AFFH provided private individuals with the ability to
bring claims against violators for not promoting fair housing.290 Like-
wise, adding the qui tam suit to the MPA will provide private individu-
als with the ability to bring claims for unlicensed practice. Just as the
qui tam suit was a solution for the citizens in Anti-Discrimination
Center, qui tam suits could be a solution for citizens under the
MPA.291
Unlicensed practice cannot be rightfully prosecuted under the FCA
qui tam, therefore the MPA needs to implement its own qui tam ac-
tion. The FCA is significantly lacking in its early detection of unli-
censed practice, while the IDFPR is best positioned to detect and
deter the wrongdoing they specifically preside over.292 The IDFPR
has the duty and experience of prosecuting unlicensed practice and
with a more concentrated framework than the FCA, qui tams under
the Illinois MPA will allow violators to be caught within five years,
rather than twenty-one.293
Qui tam actions have also been considered in the financial realm.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank) implemented whistleblower provisions following the
2008 financial collapse.294 Scholars have suggested the addition of a
qui tam provision to Dodd-Frank to more effectively enforce the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).295 Under Dodd-Frank, the
whistleblower provision is currently the only mechanism available
where private individuals can get involved in preventing bribery.296
Scholars who explored the possibility of adding the qui tam provision
to Dodd-Frank stated that doing so would allow private citizens to
290. Termine, supra note 283, at 1426.
291. Termine, supra note 283, at 1370.
292. See Fixing the False Claims Act, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, https://www
.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/PDFs/IRL-Fixing-The-FCA
.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). See also supra text accompanying notes 276–80.
293. See Fixing the False Claims Act, supra note 292; see also supra text accompanying notes
276–80.
294. Garrett, supra note 34, at 766–67. The Dodd-Frank is a large statute containing a
whistleblower program. Garrett, supra note 34, at 766. The Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower enforce-
ment applies to all its sub-parts judicial or administrative actions, including the FCPA. Garrett,
supra note 34, at 768.
295. Garrett, supra note 34, at 767.
296. Garrett, supra note 34, at 767.
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remain involved in the law suit, rather than remain “mere informants”
like private individuals are in whistleblower actions.297 Scholars have
pushed Dodd-Frank to implement qui tam actions because the actions
are excellent regulatory tools for detecting and prosecuting low-visi-
bility crimes.298 Fraud in general is difficult to detect, yet qui tam ac-
tions have undeniably proven to be successful in detecting and
prosecuting fraud.299
To draw an analogy, the MPA currently does not provide incentives
for private individuals to report violations and not be a “mere inform-
ant.”300 The MPA needs to implement a qui tam in order to incen-
tivize a private citizen to report. Additionally, the MPA cannot rely on
the FCA qui tam action because the FCA does not have the same
experience that the IDFPR has in prosecuting low-visibility crimes
like unlicensed practice.301 Adding the qui tam to the MPA would
provide an incentive to report and that report would be given to offi-
cials who have the experience necessary for prosecuting low-visibility
crimes.
Implementing qui tam suits in Dodd-Frank to effectively enforce
the FCPA would involve statutory impediments not present in the
MPA. Under the Dodd-Frank, the SEC is required to have a separate
enforcement action prior to any payout for a whistleblower.302 This
requirement has been discussed as a downfall to adding the qui tam to
the Dodd-Frank because the SEC lacks jurisdiction to hear enforce-
297. Garrett, supra note 34, at 767. Whistleblowers and qui tam actions are different in that,
under a qui tam action, the private individual brings the suit and, in a whistleblower action, the
government brings the suit. See generally Garrett, supra note 34.
Whistleblowers are not a part of the litigation but are merely a piece of the evidence if
their tip goes that far. The whistleblower does not have a stake in the matter beyond
the potential award that may arise from a successful SEC action. The whistleblower is
reliant on the resources and determination of the SEC to bring a claim, litigate, and
vociferously battle to vindicate wrongs.
Garrett, supra note 34, at 781. “For whistleblowers, the inability to bring a claim themselves
means that their tip or information may be lost when it gets to the SEC.” Garrett, supra note 34,
at 781.
The inability to bring a claim may also mean no claim is ever brought, or even if a claim
is brought the whistleblowers might have to fight the government to ensure that they
get their fair share. In short, the whistleblower’s inability to bring the claim is a signifi-
cant disincentive to the whistleblower.
Garrett, supra note 34, at 781.
298. Garrett, supra note 34, at 785. Low-visibility crimes are crimes that are purposefully con-
cealed from the government, therefore detection is difficult. Garrett, supra note 34, at 785.
299. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
300. See Garrett supra note 34, at 767.
301. See Garrett supra note 34, at 767.
302. Garrett supra note 34, at 775.
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ment actions for the FCPA.303 Thus, the qui tam actions that produce
a payout would never be eligible for the award because the SEC
would lack jurisdiction to hear the required, separate enforcement ac-
tion.304 Therefore, the payout could not be distributed, rendering the
financial incentives futile for relators to come forward and report vio-
lations.305 The MPA would not be jurisdictionally limited in hearing
claims of unlicensed practice like the SEC is in hearing claims under
the FCPA, because the MPA provides broad powers to IDFPR to
prosecute unlicensed practice.306 Additionally, there is no other gov-
ernment agency required to hear the MPA case prior to enforce-
ment.307 IDFPR is authorized to hear all claims involving licenses to
practice medicine.308
Another statutory impediment to Dodd-Frank’s implementation of
the qui tam action is whether the incentive would be great enough.
Under the whistleblower provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, there is a
statutory requirement that the action must be claiming at least $1 mil-
lion.309 This minimum is to ensure the government is catching the
“worst of the worst” offenders.310 However, the FCPA prohibits all
types of bribery, big and small, and presides over actions claiming va-
rying amounts.311 Thus, under the FCPA, the smaller claims would not
benefit from the qui tam action being implemented into Dodd Frank
because there would be little incentive for individuals to report nomi-
nal claims, since there would be minimal qui tam rewards.312
Private citizens would rather not investigate claims for $1,000 be-
cause they would not receive as much compensation when compared
to investigating a $10,000 claim. To draw a contrast, Dodd Frank
would require a statutorily-imposed minimum in order to bring a
claim. Under a state’s MPA, there is no monetary requirement on the
amount that the claim must be in order to be brought.313 To explain,
complaints of unlicensed practice only need to claim that an individual
is practicing without a license or exceeding the scope of their license,
but bribery crimes require a certain amount of money to be involved
303. Garrett supra note 34, at 775.
304. Garrett supra note 34, at 775.
305. Garrett supra note 34, at 767.
306. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/37 (2018).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 142–44 (describing the enforcement process as man-
dated by the Illinois MPA).
308. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/36 (2018).
309. Garrett supra note 34, at 768.
310. Garrett supra note 34, at 776.
311. Garrett, supra note 34, at 776.
312. Garrett, supra note 34, at 777.
313. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012) with 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/1 et seq. (2018).
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in the transaction for a claim to be brought.314 Even without a statuto-
rily-required minimum, one scholar points out, “[w]ould a
whistleblower want to risk so much and fall short of any compensa-
tion?”315 Under the MPA, each claim imposes a fine of $10,000, while
bribery claims under the FCA can be as low as five dollars.316 There-
fore, the concern of falling short on compensation for reporting unli-
censed practice would not be present in the MPA.
The qui tam provides a viable option for an incentive system to de-
ter unlicensed practice and protect patients. Nevertheless, the harm
required to justify the addition of the qui tam, may not be considered
great enough in unlicensed practice. The reason for creating the qui
tam action was centered around the harm that the violation imposed
on the government.317 The government was being financially harmed
by individuals filing fraudulent claims and thus, taking the govern-
ment’s money.318 In implementing the qui tam action for unlicensed
practice, some may ask—What is the harm being done to the govern-
ment that justifies implementing qui tam actions?
The government harm in unlicensed practice is a derivative harm.
As noted in Universal Health Services, the violator first harmed the
patient by hiring unlicensed care providers, while secondly, the viola-
tor harmed the government when it requested reimbursement for the
treatment performed by the unlicensed providers.319 Yet, this deriva-
tive financial harm may not be great enough to justify implementing
the qui tam. Under the FCA, the government harm from fraudulent
billing can be penalized by the qui tam in the millions, while unli-
censed practice will likely only be penalized in the thousands.320 Unli-
censed practice does not generate significant funds; however, the
government still has an interest in preventing harm to patients. If the
harm is not considered great enough to justify qui tam implementa-
tion, Illinois needs an alternative system to protect patients from unli-
censed practice that will provide private citizens an incentive to report
and thus deter unlicensed practice.
314. See Garrett, supra note 34, at 776 (describing the $1 million dollar statutory minimum
under the Dodd Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)).
315. Garrett, supra note 34, at 777–78.
316. Compare 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/3.5 (2018) with Garrett, supra note 34, at 777.
317. See WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
318. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
319. See Universal Health Servs. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
320. FCA claims can be up to $100 million, whereas the maximum penalty for unlicensed
practice claims is ten thousand dollars. Compare WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25 with 225
Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/3.5 (2018).
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D. Prizes for Reporting Unlicensed Practice
The use of incentives schemes has been explored in various areas of
law, including the prize system for patents. Prizes are defined as “pay-
ment[s] funded out of general revenue that is made to a[n] [individual]
conditional on delivering a specified” action.321 Without the require-
ment of government harm to justify implementing the prize system,
this system may be the needed incentive to deter unlicensed practice.
First, this section will briefly recap the prize system in the context of
patents. Next, this section will apply the prize system to unlicensed
practice to determine whether the system will provide the necessary
incentives to deter unlicensed practice. Afterwards, this section will
explore the impediments to applying the prize system to unlicensed
practice, but this section will argue that the prize system is superior to
other incentive systems and can overcome such impediments. Finally,
this section will explain how the prize system will be financed.
Under the prize system, the incentive to share the innovation with
the government is “due entirely to the reward.”322 Providing individu-
als with incentives to innovate and share the innovation is for the
good of all, including the government. For patents, the prize system
greater incentivizes individuals to research innovations that the gov-
ernment views as important. Under the prize system, the government
“gives a reward to the innovator if he [the innovator] succeeds with an
innovation,” then, unlike the intellectual property system, the innova-
tion is made available to the public.323 Hence, the incentive to inno-
vate is “due entirely to the reward.”324 The reward has to be great
enough to recoup research costs and low enough to still benefit the
government, so setting the reward at the perfect price is of concern.325
However, setting the perfect price is not impossible due to various
data that provide the government with insight on what levels of incen-
tives motivate private individuals to act.326 Implementing the prize
system to deter unlicensed practice is a valid approach to counteract-
ing unlicensed practice. The system would motivate private individu-
321. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 53.
322. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
323. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
324. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
325. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
326. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 541–42 (discussing the government’s ability to set
rewards based on sales data, demand curves, and customer surveys and how these bases remain
inferior to innovators information because they are inherently ex post rather than ex ante). Fur-
ther supporting the idea that the government has inferior information, some scholars have noted
that the “market-based process for valuing goods works only in the presence of scarcity . . . and
since inventions are intangible ideas, they are not scarce goods.” Roin, supra note 43, at 1035.
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als to report information on unlicensed practice by providing
individuals with a “prize” for their provided information. Brian
Wright suggested that under the prize system, a private individual’s
information is very valuable to the government.327 Therefore, tapping
into the private individual’s information and incentivizing them to re-
port is essential for the prize system to deter unlicensed practice and
protect patients.
However, the government would need the ability to set the perfect
price. To set the perfect price, the government must quantify both how
important the unlicensed practice information is to the government
and the social value of stopping the unlicensed practice.328 First, to
determine the social value, the government will have to look at how
much harm the violator has caused. Second, to determine how impor-
tant the information is to the government, it will have to consider how
likely it is the government would have caught the violator without the
private individual’s information. As stated, the challenge of setting the
perfect price also involves the moral hazard of the government under-
valuing the information about the unlicensed individual.329 Setting the
reward at the perfect price is essential in making the prize system
work. If the price is perfect, then the individual would be willing to
put the best investment into researching the unlicensed practice, and
the government would achieve the best outcome (catching more unli-
censed practice).330 However, as shown, setting the perfect price that
will incentivize individuals, recoup research losses, and still benefit the
government is difficult.331
Academics have determined that it is too difficult to set the perfect
price for patents. To draw a contrast, setting the perfect price for unli-
censed practice, would not “prove insurmountable.”332 The prize sys-
tem is better able to value the innovation rather than the intellectual
property system because it values the innovation after it is on the mar-
ket and the innovation’s social value is objectively determinable
through surmising data.333 The intellectual property system, however,
determines the value of the innovation before it is on the market.334
The argument that it is difficult to set the perfect price is even less
robust in the context of preventing unlicensed practice. The perfect
327. Wright, supra note 213, at 703.
328. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 541; Roin, supra note 43, at 1036–37.
329. Wright, supra note 213, at 703.
330. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534, 536.
331. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534, 536.
332. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528.
333. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528.
334. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528.
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price can be determined by considering the current data that reflects
how prevalent unlicensed practice is under the MPA and what thresh-
old of reward will incentivize private individuals to report under the
FCA.335 The government already has the data to determine what re-
ward amount is considered the perfect price because they have data
on how prevalent unlicensed practice is and data on how much money
motivates an individual to share their information with the govern-
ment under the FCA. Thus, the state can surmise how prevalent unli-
censed practice is and combine the FCA payout data with an estimate
of the information on how useful prosecuting these violators is to pa-
tients. The fear of setting the perfect price would be circumvented and
state agencies will be able to set a well-informed, calculated reward
amount for reporting unlicensed practice.
Academics have also stated that the existence of “superiority of in-
formation” provided by private individuals is fictitious.336 A private
individual’s information is arguably “imperfect ex ante” information.
The information from private individuals can be considered imperfect
because the discovery of the information is during the time when the
private individual decides on “research investment.”337 Thus, the indi-
vidual may be biased and falsely report.338 The information about un-
licensed practice could be considered imperfect due to the existence
of any bias that may be clouding the private individual’s judgment
throughout her research. This exemplifies that valid and objective re-
search on the violator may be impossible to discern. Objectivity is im-
portant in reporting unlicensed practice to prevent frivolous
accusations and careless tarnishing of reputations.339 Objectivity is im-
portant in reporting unlicensed practice; however, the likelihood of
frivolous claims being prosecuted is low because the IDFPR thor-
oughly researches the alleged violator before deciding to prosecute.340
The noted concern of bias would not swallow the benefit in a prize
system for reporting unlicensed practice. Patients inherently have bet-
ter access to information on unlicensed practice than the government
will ever have because it is a low-visibility crime. The government will
never have this information without disguisedly stepping into the pa-
335. Roin, supra note 43, at 1036 (proposing the idea that the government can link prize
payouts to the volume of sales and then surmise the innovations social value by combining this
data with an estimate of the innovations utility to consumers).
336. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 542.
337. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 542.
338. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 542.
339. See Sandvick, supra, note 56, at 69.
340. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/36 (2018) (stating the investigation procedures).
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tient’s shoes, physically visiting the violator, and witnessing the viola-
tor practicing without a license or exceeding the scope of their license.
The prize system has also been considered within the healthcare
field for drug patents. Replacing the drug patents with prizes was con-
templated in order to lower the monopolized costs of the drugs.341 In
a prize system for drug patents, the government would determine the
reward amount, and then the reward was financed through taxes.342
Imposing additional taxes always carries a sting. However, it was de-
termined that citizens overall would end up paying less for their pre-
scription drugs due to the drugs not being set at such a high
monopolized cost.343 In the drug patent context, it was assumed that
the government had enough information about the social value of the
drugs; therefore, the government could offer prizes that would pro-
vide an incentive to make new drugs and thus, new drugs would be on
the market at a lower cost.344 To emphasize, publicizing the patents
increased drug innovation and improved the output within the phar-
maceutical industry as a whole.345
Imposing additional taxes to help finance the prize for reporting
unlicensed practice certainly carries an even heftier sting for Illinois
residents. Thus, in the alternative of adding a tax, the prize amount
could be funded by the fines currently imposed on violators of the
MPA. Violators are currently fined up to ten thousand dollars per of-
fense for practicing without a license.346 Once a violator has been
fined ten thousand dollars, or more, the board347 can carve into that
amount and allocate part of it to be used for the prize given to the
individual who reported the violation. With more violators being re-
ported and prosecuted, these fines will accumulate, and thus provide
consistently increasing fund amounts for prizes to award to private
individuals who report. Similar to the pharmaceuticals industry, pa-
tients would end up “paying less” overall due to the increase in prose-
cution.348 Prosecuting more unlicensed practice would “decrease
costs” for patients because it will deter violators out of fear of prose-
341. Roin, supra note 43, at 1017.
342. Roin, supra note 43, at 1017.
343. Roin, supra note 43, at 1017.
344. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 541–42.
345. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 545.
346. 255 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22 (2018).
347. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2105/2105-5 (2017) (“‘Board’ means the board of persons desig-
nated for a profession, trade, or occupation under the provisions of any Act now or hereafter in
force whereby the jurisdiction of that profession, trade, or occupation is devolved on the Depart-
ment [of Professional Regulation]”.).
348. Roin, supra note 43, at 1013 (discussing the prize system for pharmaceutical drugs and
insurance companies; stating prizes would “de-link” the prices consumers have to pay for the
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cution. Therefore, patients will not be taken advantage of by violators
financially, physically, or emotionally. Patients will then receive ade-
quate care when visiting a doctor and can have a fighting chance to
prevent and cure illnesses.
IV. IMPACT
This Part explains the impact of adding the prize system to deter
unlicensed practice under the Illinois MPA. First, this Part will discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of adding the prize system to the
Illinois MPA in order to prevent unlicensed practice. Second, it will
discuss the likelihood of the addition of the prize system to the Illinois
MPA.
First and foremost, patient safety is the main advantage of the prize
system being implemented in the Illinois MPA. As discussed, the in-
centive from the prize system is the social value attained by the possi-
ble benefits of reporting unlicensed practice of medicine.349 The prize
system would provide a monetary incentive for individuals to report
unlicensed practice. The prize system has been said to prevent point-
less innovation payouts and thus, provide “superior incentives for in-
novation.”350 Within the healthcare system, the prize system would
prevent meritless claims. This could be accomplished by implementing
private individuals in the process of bringing these claims. With the
additional resource of first-hand knowledge and new incentives, pri-
vate individuals will have superior incentives to report physicians.
And with time, individuals will want to do so early on in order to
receive the incentive before another private individual does. This im-
pending knowledge of other individuals possibly bringing a claim will
encourage earlier reporting, and ultimately protect more patients.
Further, this will allow patients to report before they would have mer-
its for a malpractice claim because the standard for unlicensed prac-
tice is lower than the standard for malpractice.351 Patients do not have
to wait to be injured before submitting a complaint for unlicensed
practice as they would have to for a malpractice claim. Thus, the prize
drugs from the profits the innovators make off the drugs, thus de-linking the cost pressures from
the price of the drugs and providing lower prices for all).
349. Roin, supra note 43, at 1002.
350. See Roin, supra note 43, at 1003. Roin explains that pointless payouts are prevented in
the prize system because the ‘prize’ granted to the private individual for their innovation is
quantified after the innovation is on the market and its social value is determined. Roin, supra
note 43, at 1003. Whereas, the intellectual property system quantifies the innovation prior to
releasing it on the market. Roin, supra note 43, at 1003.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 243–50 (discussing the respective merits of filing a
complaint to the IDFPR and filing a medical malpractice suit).
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system will allow patients to report the physician before the injury
takes place and accordingly, patient injuries will go down. Physicians
will become increasingly apprehensive about being reported and ad-
just their practice, exemplifying the deterrence effect of implementing
a prize system.
The prize system allows the government to give a reward to the
individual if she provides the government with information.352 Provid-
ing an incentive to private individuals to report is advantageous for
the government because individuals have better access to information
on low-visibility crimes than the government. This better access is due
to violators not knowing which private individuals are carefully watch-
ing their practice, compared to when the government is investigating a
violator and provides them notice of the investigation; when the gov-
ernment issues notice, the alleged violators are in a better position to
circumvent prosecution. The government can only benefit from tap-
ping into a private individual’s information and incentivizing these in-
dividuals to come forward with information on violators.353 Tapping
into a private individual’s information is essential for catching unli-
censed practice more efficiently.
A lack of patent “races” in the prize system prevents research and
development from being duplicated.354 Within the prize system, the
lack of race to information would allow for collaboration in the dis-
covery of unlicensed practice. Under the prize system, once the infor-
mation is discovered, the innovation is made public, its value is
quantified, and such value amount is then rewarded.355 This advantage
creates the ability to provide innovation with zero dead weight loss.356
With zero dead weight loss, subsequent value can be added to the
innovation by other private individuals. This rotating wheel of addi-
tional innovation will thus create a snowball effect for information on
unlicensed practice.357 Individuals will be able to learn tactics on in-
vestigating and reporting unlicensed practice from others who have
reported, which may lead to additional reports. Dead weight loss has
been considered intellectual property’s biggest drawback, whereas the
prize system’s ability to avoid the dead weight loss is one of its biggest
advantages.358 With the ability to share resources, individuals would
work together in the effort to discover sizeable unlicensed practice
352. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
353. WHISTLEBLOWERS INT’L, supra note 25.
354. Scotchmer, supra note 213, at 181.
355. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
356. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 535.
357. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 55.
358. Roin, supra note 43, at 1023, 1025.
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schemes and possibly split the reward. Splitting the reward would not
be a disadvantage for the private individuals working together be-
cause the more pervasive the unlicensed practice that is prevented, the
larger the social value will be in stopping it, therefore the larger the
prize will be for individuals who report it.
The difficulty of setting the reward at the perfect price is a possible
disadvantage for the prize system; however, determining the reward is
not impossible.359 In order for the prize system to work for unlicensed
practice, the social value in reporting and preventing the violator from
his or her practice would need to be quantified.360 Facing this chal-
lenge involves the problem of the government possibly undervaluing
the information from the viewpoint of the private individual or pur-
posely undervaluing the information in order to prevent having to pay
a larger reward.361 However, the likelihood of undervaluing the inno-
vation is decreased due to the innovation’s value being determined
after it is on the market.362 This allows for a more objective determi-
nation because the government can look at how many patients were
seeing the violator and determine the sizeable contribution to society
the public gains from the violator being prohibited from his or her
practice. Still, quantifying this value will likely be a disadvantage to
the prize system, even when in collaboration with data from the FCA.
This disadvantage is due to the government and individuals having
conflicting interests. The government would implement the prize sys-
tem to keep patients safe, whereas individuals are reporting unli-
censed practice in order to receive a reward. Therefore, the likelihood
of private individuals viewing their discovery as undervalued is high.
Consequently, the drawback with the prize system is the difficulty to
set the perfect price without “knowledge of consumers’ willingness to
pay.”363 The lack of consumer knowledge makes it difficult to set a
reward amount without corruption or incompetence.364 However, the
disadvantage of ensuring policies are executed under moral standards
is present in much of the legislation passed in today. These disadvan-
tages can be curtailed by regulations like the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). FOIA was created for the purpose of enforcing agents to
comply with the laws in place and provide transparency of govern-
359. See Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 528. See also Wright, supra note 213, at 703
(stating that private information can provide value to the government, however, suggests that
quantifying this value is challenging).
360. Roin, supra note 43, at 1008.
361. Roin, supra note 43, at 1017.
362. Roin, supra note 43, at 1017–18.
363. Roin, supra note 43, at 1035–36 (emphasis omitted).
364. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018.
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ment actions by empowering “citizenry as a check on the govern-
ment.”365 FOIA will provide transparency when the government sets
the reward amount at a certain price by allowing citizens to check the
process behind determining the price.366 What is more, citizens will
have the ability to discover the factors the government considers when
setting an amount, thus providing a rubric for private citizens to fol-
low in researching unlicensed practice. Therefore, the availability of
regulations like FOIA will counteract the disadvantages of the prize
system in unlicensed practice.
Another possible disadvantage of the prize system is the cost associ-
ated with enforcing and administering the system. Under the prize sys-
tem, administrative costs would incur from the government
determining the reward amounts and investigating the new influx of
claims. It is argued that these administrative costs could outweigh the
benefits of the prize system.367 However, with the availability of FCA
data and the MPA data on the current presence of unlicensed practice,
the administrative costs would not be as high as imagined.368 The
IDFPR has the resources to prosecute new claims of unlicensed prac-
tice and can estimate the number of claims that are likely to be
brought. Administrative costs are much higher within the patent sys-
tem than they would be for unlicensed practice because each patent
has a different value in varying industries.369 This attribute of the pat-
ent system causes an increase in administrative costs. For example, the
drug patent can vary in price depending on the innovator, the pharma-
ceutical companies, the state regulatory agencies, the drug insurance
companies, and the Food and Drug Administration. Thus, there are
many factors in deciding what the price of the drug should be. Com-
paratively, unlicensed practice is confined to one industry with a much
smaller group of affected actors: the innovator, physician, and the
board. Therefore, the administrative costs are less extensive and eas-
ier to outline. The board can set a fixed price and likely keep that
price the same throughout all claims for unlicensed practice, with the
exception of catching a sizable offender.
Over-enforcement costs are an additional pitfall. This concern stems
from the likelihood of the social cost of finding a violator outweighing
the social value of catching the violator. For example, when a “fine is
365. History of FOIA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/his-
tory-of-foia, (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
366. Id.
367. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018.
368. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018.
369. Roin, supra note 43, at 1018.
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set higher than the social cost of the illegal activity, it encourages the
private enforcer to expend more effort [in catching the illegal activity]
because it is now more profitable for the individual enforcer to cap-
ture a share of the fine.”370 Fines are typically set at a certain amount
that will still maintain deterrence, but decrease enforcement expendi-
tures. Yet, the prize system will further lower the cost of enforcement
for Illinois by “deputizing” individuals to gather information for cases
on the government’s behalf.371 Deputizing individuals will shift the
costs of enforcement onto private individuals, and the imbalance of
social costs and social value will not be imposed on the government.
Individuals will also not be dissuaded by enforcement costs because
private individuals are never willing to expend more energy than nec-
essary to obtain a reward.372 To provide another point, private individ-
uals typically do not have to expend much energy on research relative
to the government because individuals have easier access to informa-
tion on low-visibility crimes.373 Therefore, the impact of implementing
the prize system for the MPA would only include advantages for the
government and, most importantly, for patients.
V. CONCLUSION
History shows that allowing private citizens to assist the govern-
ment, and “not just provide a tip, leads to better enforcement of the
law.”374 There is extensive history on the success of private individuals
inserting themselves into enforcement of the law when the underlying
crimes are difficult to detect, otherwise known as “low-visibility”
crimes.375 With a lack of proper regulation, unlicensed practice will
rampantly continue and patients will keep getting injured.376 Violators
are not being reported or prosecuted due to the increasing avenues
available for unlicensed practice and the lack of incentive to report.
Illinois needs a new avenue for enforcing unlicensed practice viola-
tions within its own borders. Employing a prize system in the Illinois
MPA would provide a backbone for Illinois in preventing unlicensed
practice and protecting patients. The current MPA allows for individu-
als and physicians to report unlicensed practice, but falls short because
370. Ni Qian, Necessary Evils: How to Stop Worrying and Love Qui Tam, 2013 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 594, 602.
371. Cf. id. at 601.
372. Id. at 602. See Roin, supra note 43, at 1028 (“Assuming that consumers do not pay more
for innovations than their value to them . . . .”).
373. Garrett, supra note 34, at 767.
374. Garrett, supra note 34, at 788.
375. Garrett, supra note 34, at 785.
376. Szostak, supra note 11.
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it fails to incentivize individuals to report this low-visibility crime.
Under the prize system, the government would give a reward to the
private individual if she succeeds with obtaining valid information on
a violator practicing without a license.377 Implementing the prize sys-
tem for unlicensed practice is a valid approach to counteracting unli-
censed practice because IDFPR would finally be able to provide an
incentive for private individuals to report and thus, provide the gov-
ernment with access to private information. If the prize is right, pri-
vate individuals will want to report unlicensed practice, violators will
be deterred, and patients will be safe.
Melanie R. Haywood
377. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 204, at 534.
